Abstract
Rawls account of the 'original position' is subject to many criticisms from communitarian philosophers. While this account constitutes the very basis from which he derives his theory of justice, it is regarded as being flawed and thus compromises the validity of his whole theory. The criticism focuses on the fact that the concept of the original position implies a theory of person, which is, according to the communitarians, a wrong account of human experience. According to them, it namely neglects the extent to which self is constituted by the social world in which one lives and from which one derives its conception of the good, and of how to live in society. This criticism can be a powerful one, since it is able to undermine Rawls's entire theory. Thus, the claim that the original position entails a theory of person is to be examined closely. This debate is moreover crucial within political philosophy, as it constitutes the central focus of the communitarian critics on Rawls's Theory of Justice. So the question of whether the original position described by Rawls implies a theory of person, takes us to a larger debate which opposes liberal and communitarian views on how one should think about an individual's relation to his society. The main questions which arise from this debate are: does Rawls's account of the 'original position' include a theory of the person or of personal identity, that is, does it have any metaphysical claim about self? We should start by examining in detail Rawls account of the 'original position' to understand how an individual in this position is viewed, and see what role the 'original position' plays in Rawls theory.
