Abstract
My purpose here is not to draw the historical background of the Western Sahara conflict (as it has already been done) but to give some insights on how to prevent another war in the unstable area of Maghreb. The Western Sahara is known to be the last colony of the world that has existed in spite of the decolonization process that has not yet come to an end. Instead of granting the right to self-determination to the Sahrawis, Spain gave its share- "Spanish Sahara" to Morocco in 1975. Consequently, Morocco had to fight a strong guerrilla between 1975 and 1991 in order to keep control of this territory. However in 1991, the U.N. obtained a cease-fire that had been respected so far (with some minor violations in 1994) and since then efforts were made to organize a fair self-determination referendum. In 1997, Kofi Annan appointed James Baker as the "Special representative of the Secretary General for the Western Sahara". He obtained from the parties (Moroccan and Sahrawis) an agreement (Houston agreements) that encompassed a certain "code of conduct" governing a referendum that would decide the fate of the territory. The main bone of contention in the former concentrated on the identification of the future voters. The Moroccan government tried its best to insert into the list some Moroccan tribes in order to trick the result of the referendum. However, the MINURSO (UN mission in Western Sahara) had already established a definitive list (86500 voters) in January 2000, but also had set up an appeal procedure that could be used by 50000 Moroccan people and was referred to as the next phase. In order to analyze the current situation of the issue and propose new ideas which could act as useful components of a future resolution process, I adopted certain concepts from some conflict analysis theories and applied them where ever relevant. My purpose here is not to take only one theoretical framework an apply it to resolve an issue. On the contrary, it is to request for the assistance of some scholars on different theoretical notions in order to analyze the conflict issues that occur in reality better. "The landscape of war differed so much from case to case that I despaired to find a reliable road map" said John Stoessinger. I would say that the Sahrawi case is so complex that I despaired to apply one reliable road map. I was tempted to adopt the precept of the Frankfort School i.e. the link between ICA and reality (social, facts) in some cases are more essential than the link between ICA and theories in order to understand and deal with a conflict. It is quintessential to determine the type of conflict we face (I) in order to draw a method of resolution (II) and then make proposals to prevent another war (III).
