Abstract
Diplomats, from 190 signatory countries, gather in New York this week for the five-yearly review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran will surely be present. Although some warning signs had been issued by various intelligence services during the previous decade, concern over Iran's nuclear programme became widespread in August 2002, with the discovery of the Natanz installation, destined for uranium enrichment. In October 2003, an agreement was reached in Tehran, between Iran and the foreign ministers, the three 'big' members of the European Union, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Iran agreed to suspend all enrichment-related activities, and adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency's additional protocol for intrusive inspections, and provide full information about its nuclear programme. In return, the EU-3 promised that the issue would not go before the UN Security Council and pledged to provide technology to Iran, including in the civil nuclear area. However, the IAEA later found that a report submitted by Iran, omitted references to activities involving advanced centrifuges and to the production of polonium, a material used in the making of nuclear bombs.
