Compensation for Imminent Death Anxiety: Conditions and Autonomy in French Law.
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Court of Cassation, harm of imminent death anxiety, autonomous harm, compensation, Dintilhac nomenclature, French law, jurisprudence
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Abstract
Unlock the nuances of "prejudice of imminent death anxiety" (AMI) and its compensation under French law. Discover how the Court of Cassation's landmark decisions on March 25, 2022, and subsequent rulings clarify the conditions for AMI reparations, distinguishing it from "sufferings endured" under the Dintilhac nomenclature. Learn about the critical factors that determine AMI's autonomy as a harm and its indemnification, conditioned on the victim's awareness of their state between the accident and death. Understand the implications for victims' heirs seeking fair compensation for the psychological suffering endured during this period. Dive into the legal intricacies that shape the recognition and reparation of AMI, enhancing your grasp of this evolving jurisprudential landscape.
Extract
[...] The judgment of the first civil chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 26 September 2019 sowed more confusion as it adopted an intermediate position between the two chambers. This chamber judges that the moral prejudice linked to the psychic sufferings being included in the post of prejudice of sufferings endured, the AMI cannot justify a separate indemnification unless it has been excluded from this post. B. The scope of the consecration The choice to consecrate the autonomy of the AMI prejudice by the Mixed Chamber is based on the awareness of the specificity of this prejudice. [...]
[...] The Amiens Court of Appeal had sentenced the driver to pay the relatives of the victim a sum of ?150,000 for the sufferings endured and ?1,500,000 for the prejudice of imminent death anxiety. [...]
[...] On the other hand, in order for the harm of imminent death anxiety to be repaired, the victim must have been conscious during the period located between the accident and their death. Exclusion of the comatose state as in the case of the ruling of 25 June 2019. Finally, let us note that the harm of imminent death anxiety is not conditional or linked to the existence of a bodily injury. The proof is therefore facilitated, since it seems that the jurisprudence has admitted a favorable presumption for the beneficiaries. II. A harm of imminent death anxiety to autonomy consecrated A. [...]
[...] = A psychic suffering constituted by the anxiety of the imminence of one's own end, but rather to emphasize the existential nature of this head of prejudice. This choice of autonomy is inscribed in the wake of the expansion of the conception of the anxiety prejudice that aims to take into account the deep anxiety of the victim who is exposed to a violent and traumatic event. [...]
[...] The request for compensation of the harm of imminent death was rejected. The common question that could be raised in these four cases is that of knowing what are the conditions under which a harm of imminent death anxiety can be compensated and if this harm should be repaired as an autonomous harm that would be distinct from the sufferings endured in the so-called "Dintilhac" nomenclature." The heirs in the first, second and fourth cases and the FGTI (victims' guarantee fund) filed a cassation appeal. [...]
