Council of State Ruling on Hospital Practitioner's Suspension

Extract

[...] The Council of State favourably received this argument. II. The indemnification of the practitioner admitted on the basis of faultless responsibility for breach of equality before public charges On the basis of this faultless responsibility, which is of public order, the applicant invoked two damages, of which only the first was indemnified: a substantial loss of his skills necessarily prejudicial to the exercise of his profession and a financial loss A. A faultless responsibility admitted due to the duration of suspension of service In addition to the direct financial damages of which the applicant claimed (below), the applicant also invoked a more subtle type of damage: having been suspended from service for many years has caused him to lose significantly in terms of skills. [...]

[...] In so far as the applicant also invoked as a basis the liability without fault for the rupture of equality before public charges, he therefore considered that these financial prejudices had an abnormal and special character. The Council of State nevertheless rejected this reasoning for this item of damage, as it had a significantly less abnormal and less special character than that of the significant deprivation of the practitioner's skills, which had to be acquired initially after many years of study and practice. [...]

[...] Council of State, Chambers united June 2017, n°390424 - Does the measure of suspension of service of a hospital practitioner who was eventually rehabilitated several years later constitute an error of the administration? In this judgment delivered on 8 June 2017, the Council of State ruled on a rather original case of administrative liability without fault for breach of equality before public charges. Following an inspection conducted by the regional hospital agency a hospital practitioner (public agent) was suspended from his duties as a surgeon by a decision of the Minister of Employment and Solidarity on 6 April 2000, a decision that also initiated a disciplinary procedure against him. [...]

[...] He was indeed placed under formal investigation by the prosecutor's order thirteen days later, on 19 April 2000, for injuries and involuntary manslaughter as well as non-assistance to a person in danger. The criminal procedure lasted more than eight years since it was only by a ruling of 13 May 2008 of the Paris Court of Appeal that the practitioner was finally acquitted of all charges of harm that had been retained against him in the context of the investigation. The suspension of service has therefore been particularly long in practice for the practitioner. [...]

[...] The administration conformed to an existing regulatory provision originating from Article 69 of the decree of 24 February 1984 which states:In the interest of the service, the practitioner who is the subject of a disciplinary procedure may be immediately suspended by the Minister of Health for a maximum duration of six months. However, when the interested party is the subject of criminal proceedings, the suspension may be extended for the duration of the procedure. As a result, it was judged by both the lower courts and the Council of State in this case that the prolonged suspension of the practitioner was lawful. [...]