European Union, EU institutions, European Parliament, European Council, European Commission, Court of Justice, subsidiarity principle, EU competences, EU law
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Abstract
This document outlines the institutions of the European Union, their roles, and the principles governing their functions, including the European Parliament, European Council, and European Commission.
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[...] To date, this has never happened despite a dozen motions of censure submitted. ? It is a limited impact. - Oral or written questions posed by MEPs to the commission. They can question the members of the council, the High Representative for the CFSP. Does not lead to any sanction. - Investigative committees also exist. - Petitions are possible (art 227 TFUE). Any EU citizen can submit a petition individually or in association with others, but it must relate to EU law and aim at a legal act. [...]
[...] Its decisions are binding ? are vested with binding legal force and may be subject to appeal before the CJEU. A new stable presidency Before the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council operated according to the simultaneous and identical six-monthly rotation of the European Union Council. Not conducive to the consistency of the Council's work ? very unstable Since the Lisbon Treaty, a new full-time president elected for a term of 2 and a half years, renewable once (i.e years). He is designated by the European Council itself by a qualified majority. [...]
[...] - Decision-making power since the Treaty of Lisbon, but it can also produce resolutions without binding force. The 'institutional square' ? European Parliament + Council of the European Union + European Council + European Commission. [...]
[...] We are dealing with an adjustment of attribution competences and not a violation / derogation of this principle. The court embarked on this path as early as 1956: - CJCE 29 November 1956, Federation of Coal Mines of Belgium - ECJ 15 July 1960 Italy/High Authority Undoubtedly, the most spectacular example of this exercise has been for the Court of Justice to deduce external implied competences from exclusive internal competences. The Lisbon Treaty codifies the jurisprudence of external implied competences. [...]
[...] We will prefer that a decision be taken at the national level rather than at the European level, in particular because of the democratic deficit often denounced as negatively affecting the decision-making mechanisms. It is also the excess of norms that is blamed on the European Union ? Fewer norms at the European level and laissez-faire for member states. There is also a legal aspect of positive law. This principle only applies to shared competences. ? it is a regulatory principle The content of the principle of subsidiarity What is sought is the best possible efficiency between member states or the European Union. [...]
