Extract
[...] Some states use it to enhance their image or to discredit other states, which can question its neutrality or even its instrumentalization. The fourth axis concerns the real impact of the UPR. While its recommendations exert a certain pressure, it remains to be seen whether they actually encourage reforms or are mainly a diplomatic exercise. Finally, the fifth and final axis concerns the limits of the UPR, due to the absence of sanctions, the risk of double standards, or its politicization. [...]
[...] The ICJ reaffirmed this in the Nicaragua v. United States case (1986). However, the evolution of international law has gradually tempered this absolute sovereignty. With the emergence of the principle of Responsibility to Protect the international community now considers that sovereignty cannot serve as a pretext for serious human rights violations. It thus poses a principle in tension with the imperatives of international control, subject to constant reconfigurations through mechanisms such as the UPR. The human rights bodies created by international treaties, such as the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or the special procedures of the HRC, will not be addressed here. [...]
[...] However, from its inception, this process has generated diplomatic tensions, as some states saw it as a tool of political pressure rather than a genuine lever of progress. This reform is part of a broader evolution of international human rights law, which, since World War II, has tended to limit the absolute sovereignty of states. Thus, the UPR crystallizes major tensions between national sovereignty and international control, cooperation and diplomatic pressure, moral commitment and lack of legal constraint. Five axes shed light on these issues. [...]
[...] These mutations are notably illustrated by the civil war in Sudan, Israeli operations in the West Bank, the resurgence of the M23 in the DRC, or the conflict in Ukraine, which highlights more than ever the balance between sovereignty and international pressure. To address this issue, we will first examine how the UPR, as an evaluation mechanism, encounters resistance from states that invoke national sovereignty to limit its influence We will then analyze the extent to which the UPR constitutes a transition towards disguised legal interventionism, or even a new form of international normative constraint (II). [...]
[...] Designed as an intergovernmental body intended to address the criticisms of politicization that had weakened the Commission, its functioning is nevertheless still based on a precarious balance between the need to evaluate the practices of states and their desire to preserve their autonomy. This paradox is particularly visible in the context of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). Far from being a simple technical instrument, the UPR is imposed as a space for negotiation where states, under the cover of a constructive dialogue, seek to influence international norms on human rights. [...]
