Analysis of a court decision regarding the qualification of a life lease contract and compensation for prejudice caused by its termination without cause.
Extract
[...] In fact, the lease imposed certain works on the buyer-lessor, which were reimbursable in case of moving: the occupation of the house therefore included a counterparty, that of maintaining the property and carrying out works. Consequently, according to the judges of the facts, an indemnification resulting from the deprivation of enjoyment suffered by Mrs. J must be calculated on the basis of the rental value of a property of the same nature rented annually. An appeal in cassation was lodged by Mr. who complains that the judgment condemned him to pay various sums to Mrs. J in compensation for the damage suffered. [...]
[...] The stakes of the solution are important in that it is now established that the case in question can be qualified as a life lease. The life lease has a term, the death of the tenant, so that the contract can last for many years. Thus, the fact of lending one's house in exchange for the realization of works presents risks. The solution alerts any future co-contractor to the strength of the contract and the choice of terms. [...]
[...] In this case, the supreme court has taken up the position of the Besançon Court of Appeal. The counterparty to the enjoyment resided in "the obligation to pay half of the charges and to carry out major renovation works only those of the second bathroom had to be reimbursed, reduced by the wear and tear, if Mrs. J. decided to move. The nature of the counterparty is financial. Again, the judges have broadened their position compared to the aforementioned decision of December in that it is not the payment of a serious price as such, but rather the participation in the maintenance of the house. [...]
[...] They deduced both the presence of an enjoyment of the premises by the buyer-lessor but also the presence of a contract concluded for consideration An enjoyment of the premises by the buyer-lessor Article 1709 of the Civil Code gives the definition of the lease contract: "Lease of things is a contract by which one of the parties obliges themselves to allow the other to enjoy a thing for a certain time, and in exchange for a certain price that the latter obliges themselves to pay.". This lease contract therefore implies an obligation for each of the parties: the lessor must allow their co-contractor to enjoy a thing (the house here), while the tenant obliges themselves to pay a price to their co-contractor. The aforementioned article mentions the enjoyment "for a certain time". However, in this case, it is a particular category of lease, the life lease," in other words a a contract of indefinite duration lease. [...]
[...] He generally contests the qualification of "lease". First, he considers that the property was not made available to the buyer-lessor in a private and exclusive manner, since he retained the right to stay there, at least concurrently with her. Secondly, according to him, the contract does not have an onerous character in the sense that the lease does not contain any real and serious counterparty, no presence of rent but simply the realization of certain works. Consequently, and finally, Mr. [...]
