Extract
[...] In the end, this decision perfectly illustrates the role of the Court of Cassation in harmonizing contract law, ensuring a coherent and evolving interpretation of contractual commitments. [...]
[...] As a court of law, it cannot rule on the assessment of factual elements, such as the real and serious price of the contract. Thus, if it quashes the appeal judgment for a legal error, it refers the case back to a new court of appeal, which will have to assess in concreto if the conditions of validity of the promise were fulfilled. In summary, the judgment of 21 November 2024 marks a logical evolution of the law of obligations, consolidating the jurisprudence following the 2016 reform. [...]
[...] It follows that the sole will of the beneficiary is sufficient to form the sales contract, the promisor having already given his consent. The decision of 21 November 2024 confirms this position by asserting « that the unilateral promise of sale is a pre-contract that contains, in addition to the seller's consent, the essential elements of the definitive contract that will be used to exercise the beneficiary's option In doing so, the cassation judges strictly apply Article 1124 of the Civil Code by recalling that the promisor's withdrawal does not prevent the formation of the contract, which confirms the previous jurisprudence, notably the decision of 23 June 2021 (No. [...]
[...] The Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence, by a judgment of January rejected the beneficiary's request, considering that the exercise of the option subsequent to the promisor's withdrawal did not allow for the forced execution of the sale, under the former article 1142 of the Civil Code, which provided that obligations to do could only be executed in damages and interest. Contesting the decision of the appeal judges, the beneficiary appealed to the Court of Cassation. In his appeal, the beneficiary reproached the Court of Appeal, on the one hand, for having violated Article 1142 of the Civil Code by refusing to order the forced execution of the contract, whereas the promisor's withdrawal should not have prevented the formation of the promised contract. [...]
[...] The Court of Cassation appears to respond to this objection by fully assuming the normative scope of its reversal, considering that the unilateral promise of sale has always contained an irrevocable commitment from the promisor, regardless of the formal existence of article 1124 in its new version. In other words, the 2016 reform did not create a new rule, but simply clarified a pre-existing legal reality. However, this approach remains criticizable, particularly from a constitutional perspective. On this point, Mr. Fabre-Magnan argues that it is impossible to coerce a person into consenting to a contract, considering that considering the contract as concluded despite the promisor's retraction would be a disproportionate infringement on the principle of contractual freedom. [...]
