Public finances, budgetary procedures, executive power, legislative control, parliamentary commissions, finance laws, Article 49-3, budget execution, democratic control, public law
This document examines the distribution of roles in budget preparation and adoption, highlighting the dominance of the executive and the limited control exercised by the parliament.
[...] These tensions intensify in key phases such as the presentation and voting of the budget. Tensions also intensify during budget execution, as the executive can modify credits or redirect expenditures. Furthermore, even if the parliament has means of control a posteriori, these often prove limited in their practical effects. In addition, the possibility for the executive to use mechanisms such as recourse to Article 49-3 in France, or to adopt corrective finance laws, can further reinforce the perception of an authoritarian budget management. The budgetary procedures are not reduced to a simple technical mechanism. [...]
[...] The budget vote: a parliamentary control framed by strict rules ? Limited right to amend (for example: prohibition of increasing expenses or reducing revenues). ? Use of constraint tools by the executive, such as blocked voting or Article 49-3. ? A specific case of tensions in France around the use of 49-3 to impose a finance law. II. Execution and control of the budget: a concentration of powers in favor of the executive - A. Budget execution: an executive monopoly that reduces the legislative's room for maneuver ? [...]
[...] They translate deep issues of power and institutional balance. They pose the question of democratic control of public finances in the face of the need for the executive to act effectively, particularly in a context of economic constraints or crises. These tensions are found in many political systems, whether parliamentary, presidential, or mixed, and reflect the dynamics specific to each regime. Therefore, it is legitimate to ask: To what extent do budgetary procedures translate a power relationship between the executive and the legislative, while allowing for effective management of public finances? [...]
[...] Adoption of corrective finance laws during the year to adjust the budget voted, often perceived as a circumvention of parliamentary decisions. ? For example: recourse to a corrective finance law to finance emergency aid related to the COVID-19 epidemic. - B. Parliamentary control: a limited response to executive dominance ? Role of the finance commissions: analysis and follow-up of budget execution. ? Limits of ex post control through regulatory laws: a theoretical power of sanction, rarely effective. ? Illustration with the reports of the Court of Auditors denouncing discrepancies between the budget voted and the budget executed. [...]
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