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[...] « Bank size, market concentration, and bank earnings volatility in the US Journal of International Financial Markets Institutions and Money 35-54. Dimitrios, A., Helen, L., and Mike, T. (2016). "Determinants of non-performing loans: Evidence from Euro-area countries". Finance Research Letters 116-119. Dong, Y., Meng, C., Firth, M., and Hou, W. (2014). "Ownership structure and risk-taking: Comparative evidence from private and state-controlled banks in China"." International Review of Financial Analysis 120-130. FMI (2005). The treatment of nonperforming loans. Washington, DC. García-Marco, T., et Robles-Fernández, M. [...]
[...] "An analysis of banks' problem loans"" Economic Bulletin 65-76. Berger, A. N., and Deyoung, R. (1997). "Problem loans and cost efficiency in commercial banks board of governors of the federal reserve system"" Journal of Banking & Finance 849-870. Bolisani, E. S. E. (2016). "How corruption affects loan portfolio quality in emerging markets?" Journal of Financial Crime 1-23. Boudriga, A., Boulila Taktak, N., et Jellouli, S. (2009). "Banking supervision and nonperforming loans: A cross-country analysis"" Journal of Financial Economic Policy 286-318. Boyd, J. H., and Graham, S. [...]
[...] They claim that ownership concentration (notably when it exceeds significantly reduces non-productive loans of banks. They also add that ownership concentration leads to better equity adequacy because when there is only one controlling owner, it is more likely that appropriate and prudent loans will be granted, which reduces the default rate. In contrast, in the case of dispersed ownership, owners do not bear all the consequences of their actions, which increases moral hazard problems and translates into larger loan problems. [...]
[...] It links the quality of a bank's loan portfolio to the costs incurred in monitoring and evaluating risks. In other words, this hypothesis suggests that banks that allocate limited resources to subscribing and monitoring credit risk are more profitable in the short term, but they will likely be faced with a high level of NPLs in the long term (Louzis et al., 2012). In this context, Rossi et al. (2009) use a dynamic data model on large Australian banks between 1997 and 2003, employing Granger causality tests, and find that banks that devote the necessary resources to credit underwriting, risk control, and monitoring are more likely to avoid doubtful claims. [...]
[...] "Macroeconomic and institutional determinants of non-performing loans"" Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice 47-62. Turk Ariss, R. (2010). "On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries" Journal of Banking & Finance 765-775. Us, V. (2017). "Dynamics of non-performing loans in the Turkish banking sector by an ownership breakdown: The impact of the global crisis"" Finance Research Letters 109-117. Vallascas, F., et Hagendorff, J. (2013). "CEO bonus compensation and bank default risk: Evidence from the U.S. [...]
