Abstract
September 11, 2001 has revealed an unprecedented threat that one could define as 'hyperterrorism'. At the time, what impressed the European observers most was the unability of the US to prevent such a violent attack from happening in its territory and European leaders swore to coordinate to anticipate such a threat in Europe and fight effectively against it. Since that period, progress has been made in the field of justice; notably through the creation of a European warrant of arrest and through the strengthening of Europol, but one realm has remained somehow, 'lagging behind' of the European intelligence. As Pierre Brochand (Director of the French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure between 2002 and 2008) explains, 'Le renseignement est un des derniers prés carrés de la souveraineté des Etats-nations'. By this, he means that, still today, intelligence is one of the last exclusive competences of sovereign nation-states which are looking forward to preserving this regalian prerogative. Indeed, Intelligence Services represent the ultimate concretization of the raison d'Etat. However, even before 9/11, during the 1990s, some European governments were frustrated by their unability to provide independent assesments of developments in the Balkans based on their own intelligence, further highlighting Europe's lack of an independent intelligence collection capability to support a CFSP'.
