Extract
[...] This defined indexation increases tolls at a specified rate. In contrast, fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment, noted attempt to link contractual entitlements to market conditions as they evolve. The compensation process is formal, and the equation used links tolls to market data such as the consumer price index (CPI/FP) or specific labor or material indices. On the other hand, Athias, L., and Saussier, S. (2018) have determined the flexible adjustment processes, that is, the toll adjustment processes that allow for negotiations between the contracting parties. [...]
[...] (2018) estimate that it is interesting to consider contracts as devices that fit into a continuum between totally rigid and totally flexible. They have also carried out ordered Logit estimates, taking into account the fact that contracts can be classified from very rigid to very flexible, using a classification in 11 groups. or The results of the analysis and the contribution to existing literature Athias, L., and Saussier, S. (2018) compared the two noted models and which represent their probit model (rigid vs flexible). [...]
[...] Regarding the characteristics of the contracting parties, it is found in most tender documents that repeated interactions between partners significantly favor contractual flexibility. This result may reflect the fact that past interactions between the same partners can be characterized by their experience and their ability to communicate with each other, and therefore to adapt through negotiation without conflict. In parallel, the LEFT variable defined by the authors is significant regardless of the chosen specification. Furthermore, this variable is positively correlated with the use of rigid contracts. [...]
[...] To do this, they used a a unique original database of toll road concession contracts mainly French, and considered 14 non-French projects signed in Greece, the UK, Canada, Portugal, Benin, Chile, and Thailand. To measure the government's ability to formulate and implement policies, the global indicator REGULATORY QUALITY developed by the World Bank was used. The article used 68 toll road concession contracts (motorways, bridges, tunnels), of which 54 are French. These contracts were made available by different French concessionaires under a confidentiality condition. The data on traffic uncertainty was collected through interviews with three different people from a private French concessionaire: the CEO and two other senior executives. [...]
[...] Most of the projects were negotiated over the past ten years, and the people interviewed have more than 15 years of experience in the firm. For each contract, respondents were asked to evaluate between 1 and 5 the traffic uncertainty that they expected to experience during the exploitation phase that they anticipated at the time of contract negotiation score of 1 corresponding to a contract where traffic uncertainty is very high and 5 the opposite). The variables used by the authors: - RIGID which is worth 1 if the contract belongs to groups 7 to 11 (visible in the table presenting the 11 groups). [...]
