Abstract
According to Waly and Denly, 'judged purely by its success in creating a nation-state, German history has to be deemed a failure until the nineteenth century'. Even though historians still argue over the beginning of Germany's history, some of them emphasize the importance of the 're-foundation of a 'Roman' empire in the west by Charlemagne' and the creation of a border with Austria and between German territories.
A strict distinction was drawn between the kingship and the emperorship : as the former 'could be divided among heirs, the latter was supposedly
indivisible'.With the Treaty of Verdun in 834, the basics for the distinction of future French and German states were established as the heirs divided their inheritance. Whereas some scholars see in Conrad I the starting point of a 'kingdom of Germany', other historians, and especially Gillingham 'are sceptical about the existence of' such a kingdom at this time; Henry I's authority was fragile and 't was not until the eleventh century that the term 'regnu Teutonicum' was used.' Local sources of identification – for example 'in the middle of the fourteenth century, the plural deutsch Lande was much more common that the singular Deutschland. This fact combined with universal Christian aspirations may have therefore impeded the emergence of centralized strong state
structures until the sixteenth-century in Prussia and of a significant national feeling until the nineteenth century.
The socio-political organization was still marked by features of feudalism – that is 'at the political level an asymmetrical, reciprocal relationship of service, fidelity, protection and support' sealed by an oath of allegiance – until the collapse of the 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation' in 1806. Confronted with the relative lack of politico-administrative institutions and with the fragmentation of the centers of power, it is necessary not to overlook important patterns which have structured the history of the construction of the German nation-state. The following analysis will use Robert's approach of the state,that is, an effective government ruling over a specific population within certain boundaries – and the Gellner-Zimmer debate on nationalism and national feelings.
Extract
[...] Green, « Political instutions and nationhood in Germany 1750-1914 », in Scales and Zimmer, Power and Nation in European History 55 M. Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany, p136 56 Ibid p137 12 institutions ».57 This awareness could be taken as an admission of the limited success of existing institutions in generating patriotic feeling. Bismarck finally succeeded in re-establishing the connection between nationalism, state patriotism and german political institutions, but in order to do so he had to transform both these institutions and what it meant to be German. [...]
[...] They constituted from this point of an « independent feudal magnate [class] alongside the great secular nobility », increasing therefore rivalvry between rulers. Scales criticizes Habermas' thesis who is accused of « [reducing] the pre-modern political culture [of Germany] to mere 'representation' ». The sense of a community of destiny was well known of German writers and elites who « deployed the language of Germanness and felt they knew what they meant » but we find few references to the Empire's ruler as « king of Germany ».14 The political fragmentation of the power of the local princes was consolidated by 1250 when Frederick II died. [...]
[...] As William II decided to revoke Bismarck and to follow his own politics, Germany needed to break the alliance with Russia and to center itself on Austria and Italy. In the meantime, Delcassé and the French diplomats were to sign a military alliance with Russia in 1893. In 1904 France and the UK signed the Entente and in 1907, the anglo-russia convention will settle the Triple Entente which will ultimately win the following 1914 war caused by the rise of nationalism, imperialism and the logic of the alliances. 57 A. [...]
[...] 44 During the festive mood of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Germany had rather serious aims to achieve : the necessity to establish a strong Germany which would provide « a bulwark against potention future French expansionism, while at the same time recognising that the system of a multiplicity of petty princes within a loose and ineffective imperial framework could not be restored. »45 A German Confederation was instituted. It was composed by thirty-eight states : thirty-four monarchians and four free cities. It's boundaries were basically identical but artificial : non-German minorities were included and some German populations were excluded. It was not itself « a federal state (Bundesstaat), but rather a loose federation of states (Staatenbund) »46. [...]
[...] Cambridge University Press (for the frühburgerliche Revolution and nationalism) • O. Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe : 1890-1940, London Palgrave MacMillan, 2003 2 According to Waly and Denly, « judged purely by its success in creating a nation-state, German history has to be deemed a failure until the nineteenth century. »1 Eventhough historians still argue to locate the beginning of Germany's history, some of them emphasise the importance of the « re-foundation of a 'Roman' empire in the west by Charlemagne » and the creation of border with Austria and between German territories.2 A strict distinction was drawn between the kingship and the emperorship : as the former « could be divided among heirs, the latter was supposedly indivisible ».3 With the Treaty of Verdun in 834 the basics for the distinction of future French and German states were established as the heirs divided their inheritance. [...]
