Extract
[...] This is true even in the case of budgetary policies, which are so dear to parliamentarians. Even to have a European text « that would violate the principle of subsidiarity » cancelled, it is also up to the executive to do so12. Jean-Claude Colliard uses a strong term to explain the idea of this paragraph: there is a 'political constitution' alongside the purely legal constitution. According to Jean Gicquel, it would be the 'miracle'13 due to the majority fact that would have put the Parliament and even the government in the background compared to the head of state. [...]
[...] For him, the real change allowing for parliamentary debate was brought about by the revision of July Indeed, this provided, among other things, that 'The rules of procedure of each assembly determine the rights of the parliamentary groups formed within it. It recognizes specific rights to the opposition groups of the assembly concerned as well as to the minority groups' (Article 51-1 of the Constitution). In addition, the agenda is now shared (Article 48 of the Constitution) and it is no longer the government's monopoly. Even if this sharing is not necessarily fair, we cannot deny that it is a modification in favor of Parliament if we compare it to the situation before the reform. [...]
[...] However, budgets must be defined before other measures can be implemented in any given field Despite the various revisions that have allowed to improve the powers of Parliament, 'we know well, a Constitution is spirit, a practice' that can sometimes greatly deviate from the text itself and, if the case, make it produce effects diametrically opposite to the intention of the constituent'9. Indeed, the reforms in question have not prevented a phenomenon of presidentialization of the regime in practice II. Des réformes n'épargnant pas la présidentialisation du régime sur le terrain If Parliament is indeed revalued in the constitutional text, it does not prevent the practice from being shaped by the national, or even supranational political context, ultimately leading to a presidentialization of the regime. [...]
[...] The author Hugues Portelli, on the other hand, makes a more nuanced observation in 2013 regarding the new parliamentary agenda resulting from the reforms. In the end, 'Parliamentary time is no longer perhaps the time of the government, but it is that of the majority'6. In addition, the relaxation of the rationalization of the parliamentary regime did not stop at these modifications: Article 49, paragraph limiting parliamentary power, has undergone a stricter framework. B. A relaxation of the rationalization of the parliamentary regime going as far as the limitation of Article 49, paragraph 3 of the Constitution As mentioned in the introduction, the Fifth Republic was born from a desire to rationalize the parliamentary regime. [...]
[...] When we speak of 'revaluation' of the Parliament, it implies that the Parliament already had an interesting place, but that it would have known a 'devaluation' at a given time. This is indeed the case in the light of the history of constitutional law. Indeed, under the Fourth Republic, it was a question of a very powerful legislative power. If a revaluation can be admitted, it can only result from constitutional revisions and not from the original constitution, whose objective was the rationalization of the parliamentary regime. [...]
