Extract
[...] Favoreu does not deny all interest to representative democracy, but recommends 'to ensure that the choice of rulers is made in the best way'. It goes without saying that this choice can only intervene through election, the democratic mode of designation of rulers. This 'best way' referred to by the author also lies in the consecration of universal suffrage, which, unlike the censitary suffrage, allows the largest number of citizens to vote. The equality of suffrage, on the other hand, constitutes another facet of 'this better way' of choosing rulers spoken of by the author, in that it allows for equality of all before the law without discrimination based on sex, religion, or origin. [...]
[...] Favoreu points out, 'the rule of law constitutes an improvement over democracy' II) The Rule of Law, a Strengthening of Democracy For L. Favoreu, if democracy remains an important starting point in that it allows voters to make the right choice of their rulers, but, as the author writes, 'today, the governed demand not only to designate the rulers through the most democratic procedure, but also to control them once they are designated' Thus, for this author, the Rule of Law is an indispensable step to strengthen democracy. [...]
[...] The first is representative the second is direct Representative Democracy Representative democracy has been defended by Enlightenment philosophers, particularly by Montesquieu in 'The Spirit of the Laws'. It is based on practical considerations that make it impossible for the people to exercise sovereignty directly. This exercise can, however, be carried out through the representatives that they themselves have chosen. This conception was retained by the Constituent Assembly of 1958, through the drafting of Article 3 of the Constitution, which states that 'national sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it through their representatives'. [...]
[...] The author, while admitting that the existence of a guardian or regulator is conducive to legitimizing political decisions, recognizes the increasingly active role of supranational instances, specifically designating the European Court of Human Rights and the role attributed to it in controlling the member states of the European Union. Is this allusion not revealing the crisis of representativeness, denounced by some, who claim that 'the debates that agitate politicians or jurists on the distribution of competences between the executive power and the legislative power are quite vain? The power is elsewhere, it is in the hands of non-democratic supranational instances (the European Union européenne), judges (the European Court of Human Rights, emblematic in this matter), but also economic powers'.8 ? [...]
[...] Direct Democracy In a direct democracy regime, the people dispense with representatives. They are the real holders of sovereignty, which they exercise directly. Jean-Jacques Rousseau is the main defender of the theory of direct democracy in 'The Social Contract', but he admits that this technique is idealistic. The inapplicability of this type of democracy is not synonymous with a break with all the techniques that allow the people to exercise direct sovereignty. On the contrary, the crisis of the representative model has led to the consecration of certain more participatory techniques. [...]
