Right to Act in Civil Procedure

Extract

[...] To have the right to act, having an interest in doing so is not always sufficient. It also requires the capacity to act, the capacity to act being understood as acting with the necessary legal title to the ddefence of the interest to act. From this definition, it appears that sometimes the frontire between qualitis et intinterest in acting may be porous and difficult to diffdifferentiate between adjacent notions, such as the ability to act or power. Or these 2 lastisadjacent notions in relationisdo not refer to the conditions of existence of the right to act but to the conditions of exercise of the right to act (S2). [...]

[...] Paragraph 1 - The autonomy of the action vis-à-vis the substantive law. This autonomy was won in the face of certain inconsistencies in the law, but it is impossible to affirm that the action is fully autonomous with respect to substantive law, there are still dependencies. Therefore, in order to fully understand the autonomy of the action with respect to substantive law, it is necessary in the first place to study the conquest of the autonomy of the action in order to be able to analyze the legal definition of the action in the second place. [...]

[...] This has certain consequences. Furthermore, the reality of the interest to act is not entirely sufficient because this interest must meet certain characteristics and therefore, it is advisable to reiterate the characteristics of the interest to act to appreciate the contours of its existence. There are - First, the interest must be legitimate, - Then it must be born and current - And finally, the interest must be direct and personal A. A legitimate interest This condition is stated as early as Article 31 of the CPC. [...]

[...] However, the question of exercising the capacity to exercise rights, in terms of procedure, relates to the question of the power to act. ? The capacity of enjoyment : For the natural persons : It is then a question of the capacity to enjoy rights and obligations. This question is linked to access to legal life and the end of legal life. In other words, this capacity depends on accession to legal personality. Therefore, the unborn child (embryo) or the child born not alive or not viable has not benefited from legal personality, it therefore does not have the capacity to enjoy. [...]

[...] Before 1958, an appeal was only possible against the decisions rendered by civil courts. Paragraph 2 - The competence of attributions of special jurisdictions Alongside the common law jurisdictions that are the TGI and the CA, there are also many other jurisdictions. This includes the TI, the TASS, the commercial court, ? - The competencethe competence of attribution of the TI - The competencecompetence of attribution of the Commercial Court - The competencecompetence of attribution of the Council of Experts A - The jurisdiction of the TI Like the TGI, the TI has a principle of jurisdiction and exclusive competences 1 - The compthe principle of the TI In civil matters at the end of the article L.221-4 of the COJ, there are two axes of reflection. [...]