The concept of justice and whether it can be learned through experience and education is debated among philosophers such as Rousseau, Freud, and Hobbes.
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[...] But can I reasonably elevate lying as a universal law? If I think, on the other hand, that a society in which lying is commonly admitted would not constitute a society in which we could live decently, in which we could flourish, then I must not lie myself because I cannot reasonably exempt myself from universal laws. (Transition) Thus, according to rather pessimistic philosophers, it would be necessary to correct in some way a fundamentally bad human nature. Emmanuel Kant thinks that we should be able to transcend our personal situation by asking ourselves if our action can be elevated to a universal law. [...]
[...] Can we learn to be just? (Catchphrase) Justice is a fundamental notion in our society. Justice is encountered both in everyday life, when we share our umbrella with a stranger or when a judge ensures that the same laws are applied to everyone, regardless of social status and fortune. (Analysis of the subject) But does this ability to be just come naturally or is it the result of learning? We can reasonably think that the question arises in that we find around us both people who appear very intelligent, very educated and who do not behave at all justly, and people who do not seem to have a great intelligence or a great culture and who yet adopt an irreproachable behavior in everyday life and a capacity to think otherwise than according to their own interest. [...]
[...] Can we think on the other hand that justice is not learned? We must have faith in the good natural disposition of man according to certain philosophers. It will be interesting to think about how we could, in the perspective of a dialectical synthesis, transcend these two theses that appear to be fundamentally antagonistic. I Thesis: we can learn to be just A fundamentally bad human nature We can learn to be just in the sense that being just means transcending the pursuit of one's own personal interest. [...]
[...] And in this case, it would be illusory to think that the most eloquent moral treatises could lead these people to behave justly. These individuals will perpetually seek to satisfy their personal interests at the expense of others and in particular when the distress of others can bring them pleasure. These individuals can even very well know the laws but in order to better divert them to their advantage. This is why it would be illusory in this case to think that one can learn to be just and that one can go against a fundamentally perverse nature. [...]
[...] We are probably not equal in our ability to put ourselves in others' shoes. We are not all equal in terms of empathy. Experience is probably a great ally in our ability to extract ourselves from the sole search for satisfaction of our personal interest, to which we would naturally be inclined to orient ourselves. (Introduction) From a collective perspective, should the State behave justly towards each citizen, offering each the possibility of succeeding, flourishing, and potentially extracting themselves from a socially restrictive environment in terms of perspectives? [...]
