Extract
[...] We can also extend the reflection by considering that moral action can hardly occur outside of a repeated practice of this free and autonomous reflection, of this exercise of the will: of this habit to exercise his will. These last considerations allow us to make the link between our first two moments of reflection. Indeed, moral action as a habit of deliberating with a view to good action is both inscribed in a daily practice, in the field of a repeated disposition to act, and in a reflection that is each time specific, which leads the action in its singularity and self-determines. [...]
[...] This is what Aristotle shows in theNicomachean Ethics, in Book II, when he emphasizes the duration in which the acquisition of virtue is inscribed. By examining particular virtues, such as courage, Aristotle explains that it is not enough to know what it is to be courageous to be so: one must still act courageously on multiple occasions, practice courage daily, to be ultimately considered courageous. Thus, the just person is the one who practices justice, and by analogy, we can consider that moral action results from a practice of moral action, from an active engagement with this virtue that is morality. [...]
[...] This is how Kant defines 'the categorical imperative » in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is a matter of determining autonomously (and not heteronomously) the maxim of one's action, in such a way that one treats each person, as well as oneselfnever only as a means but always at the same time as an end ». For Kant, an action is only moral if it results from a free moral judgment of the subject (of the agent) and if this action has been determined by no other imperative than the categorical imperative. [...]
[...] It would then be a matter of thinking the moral action 'by habit' as the action resulting from a habit of moral deliberation, morality relating to a habit of reflection. Without a doubt, can we try to reconcile the notion of moral action as a practical habit and that of moral action as a reflected attitude by trying to specify the notion of habit itself. In Hegel, habit is necessarily dialectical: it is what allows the spirit to become like nature, it allows the entire set of individuals to develop their subjectivity, freeing man from matter, allowing him to master given situations through repetition. [...]
[...] On what would the habit of a moral action called 'habitual' be based? Can we act morally by habit? Tendency or acquired disposition by repetition, habit makes us enter the domain of conduct. It designates a relationship between subjectivity, action, and time. It relates to what can be done not only to act, but also to improve one's action. In fact, habit does not concern such and such an act, but the sequence of a repetition, which involves both change: one loses, one gains, one organizes habits. [...]
