Abstract
Discover the insightful critique of traditional metaphysical concepts by John Locke in his seminal work, "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (1689). Locke challenges the long-standing definitions of accident and substance, questioning their utility in philosophical discourse. By examining the evolution of these concepts from Aristotle to Descartes, Locke reveals the limitations and ambiguities inherent in the traditional understanding of substance as a support for accidents. This excerpt offers a nuanced analysis of the metaphysical notions that have shaped philosophical thought, highlighting the need for a clearer, more precise definition of substance and its relationship to accidents. Dive into Locke's thought-provoking examination and gain a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding these fundamental philosophical concepts.
Extract
[...] Furthermore, in his work, he has also used the term 'accident' in this continuity and will speak of 'accidents by themselves', that is, the properties associated with a substance but which are not constitutive of the subject. In Aristotelian thought, as John Locke says in this excerpt: 'the notion of accidents' is 'like a kind of real beings requiring something in which to be inherent'. By this, the accident must be attached to the substance. The accident does not exist in itself and is always in something else. A few centuries later, the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages devoted themselves to interpreting the work of Aristotle and translated the Greek term symbebèkos, by accident. [...]
[...] From the necessity of going further in the definition of the concept of 'substance' John Locke continues: 'as we consider on its health and good doctrine the answer of our European philosophers: substance (of which we do not know what it is) is what supports accidents'; and in saying so, we have no ideas of what substance is, but only a confused and obscure idea of what it does. Thus, John Locke explains through this phrase, that philosophy readers have given a lot of credit to this metaphysical demonstration. However, when one shows advantages of scientific rigor and logic, it appears difficult to understand what is clearly the reality of the concept of substance. In his thesis David Wörner writes and clarifies our proposal: should address a misunderstanding to which the previous discussion can easily give rise. [...]
[...] It does not need other things to exist. However, as a Christian, Descartes is keen to go further in understanding what it means for substance to exist by itself. For him, this precept can only be sustained and preserved by God7. Thus, for Locke, substance was first and foremost defined by Descartes as existing by itself and for itself, even without being the support of accidents. However, what Locke seems to say by this is that this does not give us a clearer idea of what this thing is that does not need to be a support. [...]
[...] In fact, if we refer to the example, this explanation is not sufficient because it does not give us any real understanding of what supports the earth." Thus, similarly, saying that a substance supports the accidents of a thing, of a subject, gives us only a very partial view of things, inaccurate, even erroneous. In short, for John Locke, the idea of substance was used by philosophers in a confused manner without showing a sharp and satisfactory definition of what substance is. In the rest of the excerpt, John Locke continues: "And whoever asks after that, what supports the Earth? [...]
[...] In fact, first of all, it is essential to recall that Aristotle in his work Metaphysics highlights several characteristics of substance: its independence, 'substance is what is neither in a subject nor affirmed of a subject', substance can be predicated of its subject with the same meaning, it refers to a specific being, in addition, substance is characterized by its ability to receive contrary accidents4. It is worth noting that Aristotle was interested in the concept of the term 'substance' to understand and explain what change is. Thus, in the notion of substance, the notion of persistence is born. [...]
