The Impact of Visa Pricing on Immigration: A Comparative Analysis

Extract

[...] The article distinguishes four types of determinants of the demand for immigration. First, there are economic reasons: migrants seek better working conditions than those in their country of origin. Secondly, the demand for immigration increases in the event of natural disasters, persecutions or wars. This is what E. Auriol calls 'humanitarian reasons'. Thirdly, some individuals migrate due to climatic conditions, for example to escape rising water levels. Finally, a last determinant of the demand for immigration is the coercion exercised by certain individuals who force others to migrate and work for them within organized networks. [...]

[...] Second, the sale of visas could reduce the scope of action of smugglers. By encouraging candidates for migration to address themselves directly to the states in which they wish to arrive, in a legal and less costly way than through the intermediation of smugglers, it would eliminate the reason for being of smuggler networks. One can thus expect a decrease in illegal immigration and therefore an improvement in the conditions of migration itself. In the configuration described above, the sale of visas is accompanied by an increase in total immigration. [...]

[...] This offer depends on two main variables. First, it is linked to political factors, particularly the visa issuance policy of each country. Thus, when laws are passed to limit immigration, such as in Italy in 2002, in the United Kingdom between 2002 and 2007, in Germany in 2005, or in France in 2007, the offer of illegal immigration increases: since immigration becomes more difficult, all things being equal, economic agents are encouraged to set up networks capable of circumventing the existing legislation. [...]

[...] One can, for example, think of stronger repression of intermediaries in the case of illegal immigration, which will depress supply, or stronger border controls, which could reduce demand. The impact of these policies largely depends on the elasticity of demand in the smugglers' market. Suppose a policy manages to depress supply so that it goes from O1 to O2. If demand is elastic (left graph), the policy has some effectiveness: the quantity traded at equilibrium decreases significantly, at the same time as the price increases slightly. [...]

[...] These are not only often the trigger for migrations, but also the migrants' journey. In the face of the hardening of asylum policies, some migrants decide to go directly to Europe, paying dearly for 'smugglers'. These latter are organized in networks and are by nature difficult to apprehend. In this context, some economists, such as Emmanuelle Auriol, propose that governments set up a paid visa market. In other words, visas for access to European countries would be available for sale at a fixed and predetermined price. [...]