Abstract
The Cambodian Peace Treaty' of October 1991 had been designed to end the two decades of armed conflicts in Cambodia. The objective was to end a civil war, that had been backed mainly by international patrons. The mission hoped to create a 'free and fair' environment, in which elections could be held and democracy established. Initially, reinforced by wide international support and an unprecedented UN operation, the prospects of establishing peace in Cambodia was highly encouraging. Why, when UNTAC accomplished most of its initial mandates, could peace not be maintained in Cambodia? What contributed to the failure of such a peace operation? What brought about the Hun Sen Coup in 1997? To answer these questions, it is first important to define and explain the Paris Peace Accords, and the plan elaborated by the international community before its implementation. The second part will examine and evaluate the concrete UNTAC deployment, highlighting both accomplishments and failures in retrospect to the mission the UN had given itself. Finally, a study of the collapse of the Paris Peace Plan will be examined considering the union of two different complementary explanations. The first explains, that the problems encountered in implementing the plan on the ground created political consequences and therefore, altered the theoretical stability of the government structure. The second attempts, from a more socio-structural approach, to explain the fundamental weaknesses of the plan. According to Pierre P. Lizée, the gaps between Cambodian peace and its violence traditions, made the plan irrelevant and destined to failure since its creation. The following paper will finally propose to discern the lessons to be remembered from the UNTAC experience, and show how they can be useful in further similar operations.
