Extract
[...] As for the interest to act of moral persons, no difficulty. In fact, in its 1906 decision, Syndicat des patrons coiffeurs de Limoges, the Council recognizes that a moral person can have an interest to act of two types: either that the interests it defends are harmed by the contested decision (the judge then looks at the statutes of the Association, for example, and in particular its social object) or that it defends the personal interests of its members. Then, from a semantic point of view, the difference between the « avis, recommendations, mises en garde et prises de position referred to in the Fairvesta / Numericable decisions, but also partly taken up in our decision, in which the Council refers to the « warnings and positions adopted by the Miviludes and, on the other hand, the « circulaires, instructions, recommendations, notes, presentations or interpretations of positive law » appears too vague to constitute an effective dividing line as per the GISTI decision. [...]
[...] The exceptional competence of the Council of State on the grounds of manifest inadmissibility that cannot be covered during the proceedings Supreme Administrative Court, the Council of State exercises various competences that distinguish it from the Court of Cassation. It is a court of cassation but it has retained important attributions as a court of first instance, and it remains, although to a reduced extent, an appellate judge. To recall, usually one specifies that it is a competence of 'first and last resort'. [...]
[...] This does not really appear in the decision, particularly due to the inadmissibility of the requests. In his conclusions under the GDF Suez decision made in 2021, Romain Victor asserts that it is actually very thin: « the annulment of a flexible law act published on the website of a regulator is nothing other than the order given by the judge to stop the dissemination of this act in the future. However, he also noted that, although the result obtained is the same, the means invoked may not be. [...]
[...] Then, the Council of State does not dwell on the question of determining whether the interministerial mission constitutes a « authoritative body with national competence. Originally, according to the decree of 3 January 2004, it was a matter of 'collegial body with national competence', which allows us to understand - although the Council of State has never proposed a pretorian definition of this notion - that what counts is the search for a « competence of scope national scope of the authority Section Demoiselle Meaux, conclusions Jean Massot). [...]
[...] It appears, therefore, that the original illegality of an individual, decision-making but non-creator of rights (i.e. not giving its beneficiaries an acquired right to maintain) cannot be invoked except in the context of a direct appeal for annulment; in the context of an appeal against a refusal to repeal the decision, only circumstances of law or fact that have made it illegal or without object after its issuance can be invoked. From this postulate, one can question the validity of the associations' request beyond its receivability. [...]
