Discover the intricacies of France's 5th Republic political regime, characterized by a strong presidentialist trend and a rationalized parliamentary system. Explore how the Constitution of 1958 has evolved to maintain a powerful executive while limiting Parliament's power. Learn about the President's central role, the government's authority, and the mechanisms in place to ensure a balanced yet effective governance structure. Understand the implications of 'inverse monism' and the various constitutional provisions that shape France's political landscape.
Extract
[...] As for resignations, it is the President of the Republic who decides to end the functions of members of the Government or its entire members. We can certainly note a few resignations decided by this or that, such as the resignation of Jacques Chirac then Prime Minister, in 1976, or that of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, but they are sufficiently rare. The real nuance appears when presidential and parliamentary majorities diverge, in other words during a period of cohabitation. In this hypothesis, the Head of State no longer has a hand. [...]
[...] Two different situations can be distinguished, depending on whether the presidential and legislative majorities converge; however, the executive dominates in both cases. When a parliamentary majority supports the President of the Republic, the latter largely recovers the prerogatives of his Government and the Prime Minister. However, cohabitations do not truly change things. Because, of course, there is a different power relationship within the executive with a Head of Government who exercises the role entrusted to him by the Constitution and a President who has a more modest role than usual, but not negligible. [...]
[...] Also, the adoption of a law can be done without the vote of Parliament if the Government decides to take responsibility for a text. The Parliament is also very weakened in terms of government control. The conditions for bringing the Government's responsibility to be called into question being restrictive, they have only been met once in sixty years. Only one censure motion has been adopted in sixty years. [...]
[...] Article 19 of the 1958 Constitution opens up a new perspective. Thus, while a major part of the President of the Republic's powers are countersigned, a certain number of powers are, on the other hand, exempt from countersignature. We can thus note the nomination of the Prime Minister (Article 8-1 the dissolution of Parliament (Article 12 the right to message (Article 18 the convocation of the people to a referendum (Article 11 and the full powers (Article 16 the nomination of three members of the Constitutional Council (Article 56 as well as its saisine (Article 54 and 61-1 C). [...]
[...] However, they have appeared in favor of an unshakeable majority in the Government due to the majoritarian voting system, as an unlikely weapon or better still, as a weapon to force the National Assembly to follow the Government on a text. In addition, article 49-3 of the Constitution has become, beyond the stability that was sought, as a tool of pressure from the Government on its majority, without truly fearing for its survival. Other mechanisms have been integrated into the Constitution for the purpose of materializing the rationalization of parliamentarism. Thus, several means of information exist in a parliamentary regime, such as parliamentary committees, investigations, oral or written questions; however, without real consequences for the Government. [...]
