French Parliament, Government responsibility, President of Republic, Prime Minister, motion of censure, parliamentary control, constitutional revision 2008
This document discusses the means by which Parliament can engage the Government's responsibility and the limitations of this power under the French Fifth Republic.
[...] Point out that investigation commissions are created with moderation? Explanation: the fact majoritarian, namely the convergence of parliamentary and presidential majorities, implies a quasi-unconditional support for the government's action. The control of the President of the Republic The Government appears to be more under the dependence of the President of the Republic. In fact, the only provision giving competence to the President of the Republic exempted from countersigning with regard to the Government is the designation of the Prime Minister. [...]
[...] The real nuance resurfaces when we are in a period of cohabitation, that is to say when the presidential and parliamentary majorities diverge. In this case, the President no longer has a firm hand. In the 'normal' periods of convergence of the two majorities, France lives under a system of 'inverse monism': the Government actually depends on the President of the Republic, not the Parliament. Explanation: The presidential primacy which finds its foundation in the revision consisting of the election of the President by universal direct suffrage in 1962. [...]
[...] Thus: Article 48: 'at least one weekly session is reserved for questions from members of Parliament and responses from the Government.' Article 48 paragraph 'one week of session out of four is reserved by priority and in the order fixed by each assembly for the control of the Government's action?'; Article 47-2: The Court of Auditors 'assists the Parliament in the control of the Government's action'; Article 50-1: the possibility for a parliamentary group to 'ask the Government to make a statement on a specific subject, a statement that gives rise to debate and may be subject to a vote'; Article 51-2: investigative commissions are recognized at the constitutional level: 'for the exercise: 'for the exercise of investigative missions may be created within each assembly to collect, under the conditions provided for by law, information elements'; II- The relative effectiveness of the Government's responsibility before the Parliament The absence of a threat from Parliament The different means at the disposal of Parliament do not in practice threaten government action. In fact, the majority of deputies approve the general policy statements in the event that the head of the Government presents one. Then, if parliamentarians submit motions of censure, they are never approved in practice. Point out that the majority of AN members do not vote for them. For example: in 60 years motion of censure has been adopted. [...]
[...] The question that arises is whether the Government's responsibility towards Parliament is effective. Parliament has many means that have been renewed to engage the Government's responsibility but it does not threaten it due to the majority fact making the Government appear rather under the dependence of the President of the Republic (II). Engagement of the Government's responsibility before Parliament The traditional means The Parliament has under the Ve Republic, political means to control the Government. The President has the power of appointment of the Government, with proposals formulated by the Prime Minister. [...]
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