Legitimacy of Elisabeth Borne's Application of Article 49.3
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Article 49 paragraph 3, constitutional article, Elisabeth Borne, 49.3, budget vote, revenue part of state budget, constitutional law, French Constitution, Prime Minister, National Assembly, censure motion, democratic denial, parliamentary context, constitutional deadlines, budgetary issue, Robert Badinter, Constitutional Council, La France insoumise, Françoise Fressoz, Le Monde, constitutional terminology, legislative process, government and parliament tensions, pressing constitutional deadlines, finance laws, social security laws, parliamentary opposition, non-democratic aspect, counterweight mechanism
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Abstract
Analysis of the legitimacy of Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne's use of Article 49, paragraph 3 of the French Constitution to adopt the revenue part of the state budget.
Extract
[...] On the contrary, the analysis of this article allows us to become aware of the practical aspect of the '49.3' in the political game. We will focus on the question of whether the current Prime Minister makes a legitimate application of Article 49, paragraph 3 of the Constitution? The studied article exposes and demonstrates that the context in which the application of the article is inscribed allows for the legitimacy of Elisabeth Borne's choice However, criticisms remain from the opposition regarding the non-democratic aspect that it would result in (II). [...]
[...] The term 'constitutional' is used to qualify the article. This implies that it is the constituent powers that created the procedure so criticized by opponents (in this case by La France insoumise). A fortiori, we can understand that the democratic and/or legitimate character is maintained by the simple fact that it is a provision with constitutional value. However, the La France insoumise political party, dissatisfied with the use of this article on Thursday, December will table a censure motion in order to 'retaliate'. [...]
[...] This quote is taken up by Le Monde in the article submitted to our study. This formula is full of meaning since, in addition to taking up the terms of the constitutional provisions, it highlights the political aspect. This formula sets the tone on the feeling of distrust that can be caused by the use of '49.3'. However, in practice, the censure motion has only been used once since the Fifth Republic. This reality is recalled by the press article in the specific case of the censure motion triggered in December 2014. [...]
[...] This element applies both to the bill primarily in question in the article (i.e. the budget bill), but also to the political situation in a slightly broader sense. Indeed, the article refers to an event barely upstream (dating from the same week's Monday) to demonstrate that the tension was palpable already and that it continues at the time of the budget vote. Indeed, this tension materialized by 'the adoption of a rejection motion' when the immigration law was brought before parliamentarians by the government. [...]
[...] It was put in place in the framework of the rationalization of parliamentarism at the time of the creation of the Fifth Republic. The current situation mentioned in the press article shows that this rationalization has been achieved. It even shows a regime going towards a loss of power of the parliamentarian, while the 1958 Constitution aimed simply to limit it. Moreover, regarding the bill in question on Thursday itself, it had already had a first reading before the National Assembly which had not been successful. [...]
