India's Position on 'Use of Force' as 'Right of Self Defense' According to International Law, not as a Double Standard: A Critical Look at India's Recent Conflict with Pakistan
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Self-defence, anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, preventive self-defence, customary international law, collective self-defence, double standards, Security Council, ICJ International Court of Justice, international law, Indian legal framework, Kargil conflict, Mumbai 26/11 attacks, surgical strikes, Balakot air strikes, Pahalgam Terrorist Attack
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In this paper, I critically explore the changing dependence of India on the right of self-defence as described in international law by paying special attention to the hostilities involved between it and Pakistan in the recent times since the early twenty first century, i.e. twenty first century. Recent repeated cross-border terrorism which is linked with the Pakistani territory through claims to be by non-state actors, has compelled India to have retribution of starting surgical strikes (2016) and the Balakot airstrikes (2019) and the strikes at Pahalgam (2025) also known as the Sindoor strike. In both incidences, India has used Article 51 of the United Nations Charter as a justification to its utilisation of force. The given paper analyzes the unanimity of the Indian actions with those of the recognized international law norms and identifies whether its actions can be characterized by a strategic dual standard that undermines the existing normal framework regulating the use of force in international politics. In the analysis, we reprise the jurisprudential discussions about the anticipatory, pre-emptive, and preventive self-defence basing the discussion on the Caroline case of International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the major legal analysis. It subsequently outlines the international legal framework regarding self-defence which not only includes the Charter provisions, customary law, and case laws but also the positions of UN Security Council and the International Court of justice to shed some light on how the international power relations shape up the application and development of the self-defence rules. Through such standards of the law applied to the conflict history in India in the recent past such as Kargil War, 26/11 Mumbai attacks and consequent cross border operations, the paper assesses the legality of India claims and how they meet the necessity threshold, the standard of proportionality and the imminence provisions.
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[...] It does not allow states arbitrarily to join another's cause; it depends on an actual request or a standing alliance (e.g. Article 5 of NATO). Even then, States acting on collective grounds are obliged to report to the Security Council any use of force. The UN has not issued any collective-action mandate or resolution authorizing India's recent strikes (Galeotti, 2023). India has discussed terrorism multilaterally (e.g. UN counter-terrorism fora) but has not received explicit Security Council endorsement for its preemptive actions against terrorism. Thus, legally, India's strikes remain unilateral self-defence claims, not collective ones. [...]
[...] This reflects a broader trend: Security Council action is often constrained by great-power politics, so individual states usually press their self-defence claims bilaterally or politically, rather than expecting an SC mandate. In sum, the SC's formal role in approving or authorizing self-defence is largely dormant in India-Pakistan crises. India has pointed to counter-terrorism resolutions to bolster its position, but those do not explicitly endorse cross-border use of force. Meanwhile, other members (like the US) have at times warned against military escalation between India and Pakistan, effectively discouraging largescale conflict (Kasnazany, 2020). [...]
[...] cambridge.orgcambridge.org Burra, S Use of force as self defence against non-state actors and TWAIL considerations: A critical analysis of India's state practice. In Asian Yearbook of International Law, Volume 24 (2018) (pp. 106-127). Brill Nijhoff. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a690/a0cc9ab28a51af094044519a86005facc77e.pdf Catic, E A right to self-defence or an excuse to use armed force?: About the legality of using self-defence before an armed attack has occurred. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1454672/FULLTEXT01.pdf Chandra, V India's counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations: Progress and problems. India Quarterly, 76(1), pp.40-57. https://www.academia.edu/download/64388248/India%E2%80%99s%20CounterTerrorism%20Diplomacy%20at%20the%20United%20Nations.pdf Chawla, S. ed India's Neighbourhood: Challenges and Opportunities. [...]
[...] As one study recounts, leading scholars like the International Law Association insist that self-defence before an armed attack remains contested territory. Even prominent governments (e.g. US, UK, Turkey, Israel) have at times advocated broader rights (e.g. against non-state actors, or preemptively under "unwilling or unable" doctrines), but find only limited support internationally (Dickson & Gabriel, 2024). The Non-Aligned Movement and large majority of states have resisted expansion, reaffirming the traditional charter regime. In short, the right of self-defence in customary international law remains that of reaction, not aggression: states may use force in self-defence only upon being "violently attacked" and must report such measures to the UN Security Council. [...]
[...] The evidence suggests that India consistently frames its use of force as self-defence under international law, not as an arbitrary exception. In each case, India pointed to an actual armed attack (by terrorists) as the trigger, invoked Article 51, and asserted it met necessity/proportionality. India's 2016 and 2019 operations were explicitly cast as responses to specific violence (Uri and Pulwama) rather than unprovoked aggression (Sandin, 2021). In diplomatic remarks, Indian officials even outlined conditions under which force on foreign soil is lawful: repeated attacks, Pakistan's inability or support of attackers, etc . [...]
