Abstract
Why a subdue Public Administration to politics is not desirable?
David H. Rosenbloom and Robert S. Kravchuk's textbook on Public Administration defined three general approaches to administrative theory and practice: the management one, the political one, and the legal one which emphasizes legalistic concerns. As the purpose of this essay is to study the relationships between politics and Public Administration, I will use the political approach. According to the traditional definition, Public Administration is supposed to execute politics' will. In Woodrow Wilson's words, it is "the government in action".
From this brief definition, two things can be said: firstly, a clear dichotomy between politics and Public Administration exists. Secondly, politics is considered as superior to Public Administration: one could say that public administrators are the "servants" and the political actors, the masters. Indeed, politics take the decisions that the public administrators have to implement.
But this superiority of politics can lead to a domination of Public Administration, this is what can be called a "complete subdue Public Administration". It implies strict obedience of Public Administration, inhibition, control, lack of liberty in bureaucrats' action and disciplinary measures if those restrictions are not respected.
The purpose of this essay is to show why this kind of Public Administration is not desirable and why the balance of powers between Public Administration and politics should not be too asymmetric. It will be seen several "degrees" of domination: from "complete" subdue Public Administration to a more moderate one with the Weber's thought.
For that, I will develop three main arguments:
1.The "primitive model" of a complete subdue PA is now outdated.
2.The Weber's model of a devoted but neutral PA is not totally satisfactory.
3.There are many benefits to more independence.
