Transsexualism and Birth Certificate Change

Extract

[...] This deed concerns the sale of a plot of land for which Madame the donor, undertook to make a donation to her son, the beneficiary. In addition, the clause prohibits the beneficiary or his heirs from alienating, dividing or subdividing the property for 15 years, so that they must themselves exploit the land. However, in 1976, the beneficiary left the exploitation and in 1978, the donor sold the property to Safer. It is in this way that the beneficiary sued his mother, the donor, for payment of the value of the property he should have received. [...]

[...] The court rejected his first claim but granted him the second. An appeal was then lodged. The Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence delivered its judgment on 15 November 1990. It confirmed the decision of the first-instance judges. It ruled that the interested party's deep conviction of belonging to the female sex and his will to behave as such could not suffice to have him recognized as a woman on the basis of the principle of the indisposability of the state of persons. [...]

[...] A cassation appeal was lodged. The question that arises in this case is the following: Does the principle of the indisposability of the state of persons oppose the change of sex on the birth certificate in the context of transsexualism syndrome? In accordance with Articles 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Articles 9 and 57 of the Civil Code, the full bench of the Court of Cassation delivered a judgment of cassation. [...]

[...] Following a judgment rendered by the first instance judges, an appeal was lodged. The Nancy Court of Appeal thus rendered an annulment judgment on 15 November 1984. It grants the beneficiary's request by estimating that he is a beneficiary of a stipulation for another. A cassation appeal is lodged by the donor. She estimates that circumstances have deprived the litigious promise of cause. More precisely, according to her, there is nullity of the contract for another and of the stipulation for another because certain obligations/interdictions are external to the contract. [...]

[...] Court of Cassation, Plenary Assembly December 1992, 91-11.900, Published in the bulletin In the judgment delivered by the Court of Cassation on 11 December 1992, the plenary assembly clarified the principle of the indisposability of the state of persons by interpreting both European law and the Civil Code. In this case, a person named René, born on 3 March 1957, was declared on the civil status registers as being of male sex. Considering herself to be a woman, the interested party underwent hormonal treatment and, later, removal of her external genital organs with the creation of a neo-vagina. [...]