Absence of Executive Independence under III Republic

Extract

[...] In this sense, it refutes the idea of a parliamentary regime based on a dualism between the two powers and insists that the 1875 Constitution, while theoretically attributing competences to the Executive, deprives it in fact of any autonomous initiative. We will therefore first see how Carré de Malberg highlights the absence of independence of the Executive under the III Republic before analyzing its critique of monistic parliamentarism which follows from it (II). I. The absence of independence of the Executive under the III Republic A. The necessity of a proper will for the Executive Raymond Carré de Malberg emphasizes that a true executive organ must have a proper will, that is, an autonomous capacity for action. [...]

[...] However, in practice, this right is unusable, because it is subject to the approval of the Senate, which itself represents the assemblies. Similarly, other executive prerogatives, such as the possibility of requesting a new deliberation of the laws, are emptied of their substance by the systematic opposition of the chambers. Carré de Malberg concludes that the Constitution of 1875 'took back with one hand what it gave with the other': by granting powers to the Executive while preventing it from exercising them, it creates a contradiction that eliminates any notion of dualism. [...]

[...] The Constitution of 1875 attributes powers to the Executive, but deprives it of the means to exercise them freely. The author compares this situation to that of other regimes. Under the Constitution of 1791, for example, the king had a real power of initiative, particularly in legislative and diplomatic matters. He could thus act without the approval of the Legislative Corps in certain spheres of competence. In contrast, under the III Republic, no executive initiative escapes the control of Parliament. [...]

[...] Therefore, even if constitutional texts seem to confer a power of decision on it, this power is in reality non-existent since it is immediately subordinate to the will of the assemblies. Carré de Malberg goes further in explaining that this dependence prevents any true separation of powers. In principle, a balanced parliamentary regime is based on a distinction between the spheres of action between the Executive and Parliament. But in the absence of a proper will, the Executive ceases to be an independent power and becomes a simple instrument of the legislative. B. [...]

[...] Carré de Malberg notably mentions the resistance opposed by the chambers to certain executive prerogatives, such as the right of dissolution. By preventing the Executive from using its own means of action, Parliament deprives it of any faculty of resistance and condemns it to complete submission. Thus, although the 1875 Constitution appears to provide a distribution of powers, this is purely theoretical. In reality, Parliament concentrates the entire sovereignty and exercises the direction of public affairs alone, relegating the Executive to a simple role of executive agent. [...]