International Law, State Sovereignty, Treaty Law, Customary International Law, International Organizations, Normative Power, International Judge, State Succession, Relative Effect of Treaties
This document discusses how states can be bound by international law norms without their explicit acceptance, through various means such as treaties, custom, and the role of international organizations and judges.
[...] If states adhere to the international organization, they are still constrained by acts, without having given their specific consent to such international law norm. In fact, consent can be characterized in the establishment of the international organization, with the constitutive act, but not for each derived law norm, unilateral act taken by international organizations. In addition, within the framework of the United Nations Security Council, acting to maintain international peace and security, decisions with a binding character can be taken, particularly under Chapter VII, which derogates from the principle of non-use of force and non-interference in the affairs of other states under Article 2§4 of the Charter. [...]
[...] However, international law establishes norms that are imposed, without categorically requiring the explicit consent of states. In this sense, it looks more at the practice of states, their tacit acceptances, the fundamental object of norms. Thus, to what extent can a state be engaged by an international law norm to which it has not explicitly consented? Despite the strong principle of sovereignty recognized in international law, a state can be engaged by a norm it has not formally accepted through its own acts and behaviors but also by the role of other international law subjects, which establish binding norms for states (II). [...]
[...] Are states only linked by the international norms they have formally accepted? Public International Law: « Are states only linked by the international norms they have formally accepted? » ? The Palmas Island Arbitral Sentence, rendered in 1928 by the CPA, affirms the principle of state independence, synonymous with its sovereignty; a state is independent to govern its internal organization, but also vis-à-vis other states. It follows from this principle the state's capacity to freely choose how it wishes to engage with other subjects of international law. [...]
[...] In addition to custom, the judge also derives imperative norms, imposing themselves on all states. These imperative norms are not defined, but have an important place in international law. An international treaty cannot derogate from them, even in the event of a later appearance of the imperative norm. In this case, a treaty, issued from the will with the express consent of the states, is overturned by an imperative norm, to which the states do not consent explicitly. Beyond the power of the judge deriving spontaneous law norms, international organizations with normative power can also determine international norms. [...]
[...] A gap in this article is having forgotten unilateral acts. These different sources are capable of engaging the state, subject of international law. According to the Montevideo Convention of 1933, a state is composed of a delimited territory on which a population is governed by a Government. Repeating these three classical criteria of the sociological approach to the state, the Badinter Commission of 1991 recalls that the constitution of a state is a matter of fact. States, sovereign on the international scene, are linked by international norms, that is, they are bound by these norms that are opposable to them, with obligations imposed on them, and which can lead to the engagement of responsibility if they are not respected, or condemnation by international courts. [...]
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