Extract
[...] First, in the first part, the philosopher presents her thesis, starting with the use of a reasoning that she will then contradict: 'In spite of the great influence that the concept of an inner freedom that is not political has exercised on the tradition of thought, it seems that'one can affirm" (l. 1-2). It recalls a philosophical thesis in order to contest it: this is a classic rhetorical device, and it is also an effective way to introduce her thesis, and thus to oppose the authority of an "inner freedom". We then understand that she opposes the abstract freedom of the mind and concrete freedom, "tangible", which manifests materially through exchanges with others. [...]
[...] This is indeed what is implied at line 11: to achieve the 'status of the free man', one must also have free time during which one does not work or take care of one's home. Hence the act of 'liberation', which is performative: the subject liberates himself from the prosaic constraints to gain his freedom. The second idea is implicit, regarding the encounter with others, we think of the famous proverb that says 'freedom stops where that of others begins'3. [...]
[...] Can we reach 'inner freedom' if we do not share a 'tangible freedom' with others? Finally, can we be free in a society that is not? The philosopher's thesis is that, precisely, 'inner freedom' is correlated with the encounter with other 'free men' (l.16), with whom one can freely exchange in a 'public space' (l.14). In this sense, the independence of spirit is dependent on a political freedom, that is, embodied publicly, in a society. The plan of the text can be studied according to three main movements. [...]
[...] Thus, the home alone is not sufficient to generate freedom because it is not nourished or restricted by 'the company of other men' (l. 14). Finally, in this third and final part, Hannah Arendt explores the idea of a 'tangible' freedom and sets out the conditions relating to her thesis - in this sense, after having approached her thesis in an explanatory and demonstrative manner, she approaches it from the point of view of a concrete reality, she answers the question 'how?'. [...]
[...] So, the question of individual freedom has no meaning if it is not politicized, in the same way that it has no meaning if it does not exist concretely: 'Freedom as a demonstrable fact and politics coincide' (l. 17). She implies here, to answer the initial question, that 'inner freedom' has no real value without a 'status' of freedom - a status granted by a political system. Thus, for Hannah Arendt, shared freedom with the other within a public space is an intrinsic condition for the deployment of inner freedom, and this because freedom must be embodied by concrete and political factors. [...]
