Abstract
This one surely counts among the boldest expressions of Spinoza's pantheistic system in the Ethics ; and even though that system is well-known primarily for its radicality, we should make sure some further analysis is given which explicates it well enough, before we can even start discussing it seriously. What does Spinoza exactly mean by this – how does this kind of pantheism work?
This – rather strong, indeed – metaphysical claim appears as the fifteenth proposition in the first part of the Ethics ; as such, it is supposed to flow from a relatively small number of definitions and previous theorems. The argument goes as follows : (i) there can be only one substance, namely, God ; (ii) therefore, every particular thing must be a mode of this substance ; (iii) modes, by definition, are to be conceived through that thing in which they inhere ; (iv) therefore, ‘whatsoever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God'.
It seems valid ; is it sound ? We shall analyze every premise separately ; however, it should appear to everyone that (i) requires special attention, for it bears the most important and difficult part of the justificatory task : (ii) is only an immediate corollary of this first premise1, and (iii) merely expresses a relatively typical definition in modern philosophy. As we shall see, only with (i) does Spinoza introduce a very peculiar feature of his philosophy ; that is why its analysis is bound to be a crucial test for the whole argument, while (ii) and (iii) require, as it were, only some further clarification, regarding the traditional views in metaphysics at Spinoza's time.
