Abstract
EU diplomatic relations with China were established in 1975 and are governed by the 1985 EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement and seven other legally binding agreements. This rapprochement between the two powers culminated in the setting up in 1988 of a delegation by the EC Commission in Beijing just before the relation started to deteriorate as a result of the Tiananmen events in 1989. Despite persistent tensions on human rights issues, the EU's relation with China has continuously deepened including support for China's accession to the WTO in 2001. By launching a ‘strategic partnership' in 2003, EU is clearly acknowledging China as a key player in the global arena.
However, is there a full convergence of all 27 national member states towards a unified EU foreign policy towards China? Or is there a competition preventing a better coordination and undermining the achievement of an influential CFSP? Therefore, this essay will attempt to assess whether Sino-EU relations have been translating into a convergence of the foreign policies of individual EU Member States or if they provide a good example of how national interests prevail. In order to tackle these questions, the essay will focus on three areas: the ‘low politics' of trade, the ‘high politics' of security, and finally human rights and the promotion of democracy.
Extract
[...] To what extent have the national foreign policies undermined EU-Chinese relations? EU diplomatic relations with China were established in 1975 and are governed by the 1985 EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement and seven other legally binding agreements. This rapprochement between the two powers culminated in the setting up in 1988 of a delegation by the EC Commission in Beijing just before the relation started to deteriorate as a result of the Tiananmen events in 1989. Despite persistent tensions on human rights issues, the EU's relation with China has continuously deepened including support for China's accession to the WTO in 2001. [...]
[...] Similarly, the US values economic benefits, Hilary Clinton even stated that human rights should not interfere with other interests in China and although Obama promised to take a tougher stance, he deferred meeting the Dalai Lama in order to prevent offending China.52 To conclude, trade and national interests prevail, hindering a unified economic and political relationship. The strategic partnership is hampered by short-term economic gains in particular for the Big Three, at the expense of the long-term EU political vision. With regards to human rights the EU lacks leverage for two reasons: the institutional weakness in terms of the Commission's inability to insert political and human rights clauses into trade agreements. Secondly, the imbalance of the trade dependency means that China is not as reliant on the EU. [...]
[...] An example of when 'the Commission and Member States acted in concert was the case of the textile quota conflict in 2005'8. Finally, this partnership continues to develop. In 2007, negotiations opened to upgrade the EU-China Trade and Cooperation Agreement into a fully-fledged Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Moreover, the Chinese value personal contacts and trust with leaders. Solana decided 'that China would not be his top priority'9; yet, this is likely to change, as the momentum has been towards more Europe in foreign policy. [...]
[...] France also has aid and cooperation programes running in China on science, technology, education and judicial projects. Thirdly, although UK's relations with China strained as Hong Kong's colonial master, following the handover in 1997 relations eased under Blair's government. A Sino-British strategic partnership was also announced in 2004, as well as an interaction group on China in the British Parliament to plan activities and mutual state visits.18 Along with business deals such as the $1.3 billion package of contracts including the sale of Rolls-Royce aircraft engines to Air China19, the UK sees the Dragon also as holding very high strategic relevance since both sit permanently on the UN Security Council20. [...]
[...] Overall, due to the weakness of EU foreign policy and the strength of national political wills, to varying extents depending on the policy area, national foreign policies can and do undermine EU-China relations. Since China has so far bought -i.e. ?630 billion- of the total euro-zone debt from countries such as Portugal, Spain and Greece, 53it will be interesting to see how this affects the dynamics of EU-China relations. Bibliography -Barroso, José Manuel (2008) Remarks by President Barroso at the joint press conference with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Beijing http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/international/docs/speech_20080425_en.pdf Accessed 06/02/2011 - Barysch, K. [...]
