Extract
[...] For a supranational institution like the EU, lobbying is also a tool for consensus. In reality, it offers a channel for dialogue and political legitimation beyond parliamentary elections, allowing European institutions not directly elected - primarily the Commission - to interact with citizens and take into account their demands. In other words, the EU is a supranational organization that must at the same time find a balance between the interests and positions of the 27 member states. There are therefore multiple economic, social, and political interests to reconcile. [...]
[...] Next, let's move on to another actor of Japanese lobbying where manufacturers can have links. It is the JETRO, the Japanese organization for external trade, which presents itself as paragovernmental organization for the promotion of exchanges and investments'101. For Mr. F., this structure was in 'first line' during the EU-Japan negotiations for the JEFTA. In fact, according to him: « The main objective (during the negotiations) was to eliminate the approval of rights (customs fees/export-import) on Japanese cars so that they could compete at a similar level with Korean automakers who had already concluded a similar agreement a few years earlier to eliminate these rights. [...]
[...] In interdependence with Japanese political institutions, the major names in the Japanese automotive sector have come together in several structures (JBCE, JAMA, ACEA) to maximize their interests within the EU. In fact, what will characterize Japanese lobbying compared to the European way is the very diplomatic way of doing lobbying, without making waves, as it were. The Japanese talk to everyone, and are very sensitive to respect for the rules. The practice is therefore framed according to precise rules of transparency. The influences were really felt through the importance of the group, for example Toyota or Nissan, which were able to enter the inner workings of the EU. [...]
[...] & Saurugger, S. (2012). Chapter 2 - Interest Groups as Political Actors: Genesis and Evolution. In: E. Grossman & S. Saurugger (Eds),Interest Groups: Collective Action and Representation Strategies (pp. 55-92). Paris : Armand Colin. Grossman, E. & Saurugger, S. [...]
[...] As a result, the EPA eliminates or reduces most customs duties in both directions, and particularly benefits European agricultural producers, who increase their competitiveness in Japan, particularly in products such as cheese, meat or wine11. Automotive manufacturers also benefit from the agreement, as customs duties are gradually reduced over a period of 7 years until their elimination12. A data that remains particularly interesting in our choice to focus on this economic sector. As a result, a whole series of measures are therefore included and aim to reduce or eliminate non-tariff barriers, particularly important in the case of Japan as they have been used strategically to protect its market13 (Hirano, Yamada, 2023). [...]
