DSA Regulation for Digital Sovereignty

Extract

[...] Towards a resilient and sovereign European model: breaking away from the soft law for constraining the digital giants - Reconsideration of the hosting status for recalcitrant platforms: transition to an editor liability in certain cases; - Obligation of reinforced cooperation under penalty, including with entities not established in the EU; - Inclusion of DSA in a European digital sovereignty strategy: articulation with DMA, AI Act, and future Media Freedom Regulation in preparation. Conclusion: By giving the European Union a central role in regulating digital services, the DSA embodies a profound shift in the legal paradigm for combating online violence. [...]

[...] The significant contribution of the DSA: towards a partial but structuring substitution of French law in the fight against online violence A. The unification of the liability regime of digital intermediaries: a move beyond the fragmentation of French law - Comparison between the fragmented logic of the 1881 law, LCEN (Digital Economy Trust Act), Penal Code, and the horizontal approach of the DSA; - Legal contributions of the DSA in terms of liability: differentiated regimes according to size, procedural obligations of withdrawal, risk assessment, reasonable diligence obligations. [...]

[...] However, this second-generation regulation remains perfectible. By delegating part of the normativity to the platforms via their general terms of use, without setting clear European definitions of hate speech or violence, the DSA maintains a form of legal ambiguity. It exposes users to fluctuating standards, potentially contrary to the principles of legality, legal predictability, and the hierarchy of norms. In addition, the effectiveness of the text will ultimately depend on its implementation, both by the Commission and by national authorities, whose means, skills, and will vary greatly from one state to another. [...]

[...] Such an ambition requires not only the strengthening of legal instruments, but also the clarification of European digital constitutional principles, still largely to be built. While the DSA marks a more ambitious partial refoundation of the regulatory framework applicable to digital platforms, it reveals a broader question: that of the European law's ability to build a true digital sovereignty based on the protection of fundamental rights. As sectoral regulations multiply, whether it is the Digital Markets Act, the future media freedom regulation or the AI Act, the emergence of a European digital law seems to be taking shape. [...]

[...] Persistent limits of the DSA: an incomplete regulation in the face of online violence A. A lack of European definition of online hate and the persistence of the French penal law role synonymous with normative indeterminacy - Lack of definition of hateful or violent content in the DSA: necessity of a referral to the penal law of the member states (competence preserved by article 89 of the DSA) ; - Example: difference between inciting hatred (which is penalized in France) and toxic but licensed content; - Maintenance of the competence of the French judicial judge for certain qualifications. [...]