Human Freedom and Determinism: An Analysis of Rousseau's Philosophical Argument

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"Human Freedom and Determinism: An Analysis of Rousseau's Philosophical Argument"

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Human freedom, free will, determinism, causality, philosophical argument, Rousseau, internal causality, external causality, human actions, voluntary acts, intelligent actions, moral responsibility, human condition, natural determinism, law of causality, Spinoza, philosophical debate, human uniqueness, Émile, On Education, active principle, freedom of choice, self-determination, human will, philosophical theory, moral philosophy, ethical discussion, human nature, philosophical discussion, freedom vs determinism, causality principle, Rousseau philosophy, human behavior, philosophical analysis, human autonomy, freedom and determinism debate

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Abstract

Discover the profound insights of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on human freedom and determinism. In his influential work, Émile, or On Education (1762), Rousseau argues that man is not a passive product of external causes, but rather the active principle of his intelligent and voluntary actions. He contends that human freedom lies in our ability to will what we consider best for ourselves, independent of external determinism. Rousseau's philosophical treatise explores the condition of man in the face of natural determinism, asserting that our freedom is rooted in our internal causality, not external influences. Uncover the nuances of Rousseau's argument and gain a deeper understanding of the human experience.

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[...] Stakes: The mechanism of La Mettrie (human body = machine), the materialism of Baron d'Holbach who says a. that everything has a cause and is the product of a natural cause b. that there are therefore only causes and effects and therefore never free actions but only necessary actions as necessary effects of causes) These two theories argue that man is only the product of a bodily mechanism and subject to external natural causes that determine him to be what he is. [...]

[...] Important point: Yes There is an incitation to want our good: this could be interpreted as a form of determinism But No because our freedom is to want what I think is the best for me. III/ Line 12 to the end: Conclusion. After having succeeded in refuting determinism and having affirmed and demonstrated the existence of human freedom lodged in our will to aim for what we consider to be the best for us independently of the causes that determine us: Rousseau refutes the conception of the causality of determinisms: true causality is when there is a free act at the origin that is and becomes a cause, there is no cause before the first act, it is the free act that generates the effects. [...]

[...] When I give in to temptations, I act according to the impulse of external objects. When I reproach myself for this weakness, I only listen to my will: I am a slave to my vices, and free by my remorse; the feeling of my freedom does not fade in me except when I corrupt myself, and when I finally prevent the voice of the soul from rising up against the law of the body. Commentary Plan Line 1 to Partial concession to the law of causality and determinism: Yes, there are external causes that impose themselves on us, but there is also a resistance that means there is something other than determinism alone, otherwise there would not be a feeling of not feeling free when one is dominated by superior forces that go against our will. [...]

[...] And what is the cause that determines my judgment? It is my intelligent faculty; the determining cause is within myself. Without a doubt, I am not free not to want my own good: but my freedom consists in this very thing that I can only will what is suitable for me, or what I consider such, without anything foreign to me determining me. Does it follow that I am not my own master, because I am not the master of being another than myself? [...]

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