Generic medicines, social security deficit, healthcare costs, pharmaceutical industry, health insurance, price regulation, medication reimbursement
The French government aims to achieve an 85% substitution rate of medicines with generics to reduce the Social Security deficit, expected to reach 2.2 billion euros in 2018.
[...] This is explained by a too small list of generics compared to other countries; for example, aspirin or paracetamol are not present. The French market for generics remains thus dominated by Mylan and Biogaran, a subsidiary of Servier, which respectively hold 29% and 28% of market share, followed by Sandoz with 12% (Les Echos, March 20, 2018)20). In addition, if we take the rate of substitution of branded medicines, it goes from 68% in 2010 to 80% in 2017, but there is still room for improvement to go further and reach 90%. [...]
[...] In these conditions, the introduction of generics lowers the demand for the original, and the producing firms are led to increase the price" De plus for Scherer (19938), The introduction of generics does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the price of the originals due to the "paradox of generic competition" that it highlights. However, Kong (2008"9) develops another analysis of this paradox starting from the postulate that the type of medical coverage segments the consumers of medicines. Thus, those better covered by health insurance are not sensitive to prices and costs, unlike those who are less well covered, who will then buy generics. Frank and Salkever (199710) studied 32 drugs, with the patent expiring over the period 1980-85. [...]
[...] In particular, it is possible to reduce the thorny problem of the Social Security deficit by prioritizing the consumption of generic drugs over the originals. This results in a change in behavior on the part of the insured, but also an impact for the industrialists in the sector who must take into account this new competition in their global strategy. Finally, public authorities have a particularly decisive role since they are the ones who authorize the entry of generics into the market and set prices and their reimbursement. [...]
[...] Under these conditions, the greater the price difference between these two versions of the drug, the stronger the demand for generics. However, if the difference is too small, the demand for generics is zero. Other studies show that the pricing of generic producers is negative due to more intense competition (cf. Snoussi, 201516). Finally, it appears that the quality and reliability of certain categories of generics would not be as equivalent as the originals according to the Academy of Medicine17. The doubts are about the 'antiepileptics, anticoagulants, hypoglycemics and thyroxine" (Le Figaro February 201218). [...]
[...] However, the variation in the price of the originals is difficult to explain. Pavcnik (200213) examines the case of Germany and takes into account the change in the reimbursement system on the prices of oral antidiabetics and antiulceratives from 1986 to 1996. Thus, after the change in insurance, prices fell by 18% on average for the first with a decrease of 11% for generics and 26% for originals; and the same applies to antiulceratives. Bergman et Rudholm (200314) studied the Swedish case the impact of the presence of generics and potential competition, that is, when the patent of the original expires but there is not yet a generic, on prices over twenty-four years (1972 to 1996). [...]
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