Extract
[...] It is worth citing the famous Altmark judgment, which defined the four conditions for the existence of state aid (CJEU July 2003, case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH, Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg and Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH: Case-law CJEU 2003, p. 7747): any state support must be qualified as state aid, within the meaning of Article 107, paragraph TFEU, when it is not linked to a clearly defined public service mission and/or when the calculation of the compensation allegedly necessary to perform the said mission has not been made on the basis of parameters previously defined in an objective and transparent manner, in order to avoid this compensation from containing an economic advantage that may favor the public enterprise concerned compared to other competing enterprises (see CJEU November 2003, cases C-34/01 to C-38/01, Enirisorse SpA v Ministero delle Finanze). [...]
[...] To this end, they may impose on them any corrective measure of a structural or behavioural nature proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement to an end definitively: This article therefore significantly reinforces the powers of national competition authorities, which can also, under Article 16, impose fineseffective, proportionate and deterrent to undertakings and associations of undertakings ». In summary, by giving more weight to national competition authorities in the effective implementation of the common market, the European legislator not only strengthens but also fills the gaps concerning the harmonization procedure for the application of European law initiated by the CJEU, and thereby significantly strengthens the control of the respect of European competition law by the Member States. [...]
[...] In France, the Competition Authority is now competent in three areas, which constitute the economic public order: it acts on cartels, concentrations, and abuses of dominant position. With the implementation of this regulation, national actors will now play a crucial role in the application of European competition rules, alongside European institutions. National competition authorities and national courts will thus see their role increase in the implementation of European competition law, alongside the European Commission, with which they work in close cooperation within the European Competition Network. [...]
[...] CJCE 1991, p. 3359). The same Akzo judgment has also expanded the definition of the concept of the market, stating that an abuse can also affect a neighboring market of that on which the abusive practices have manifested themselves in so far as the constituent elements of the infringement are met, namely market dominance, abuse and distortion of competition in the common marketsee in this sense CJCE July 1991, aff. C-62/86, Akzo Chemie) In short, these two founding judgments have contributed to the delimitation of the criteria of abuse of dominant position, and allow the CJEU to exercise today a real control of the respect of competition by the Member States, in order to allow the realization of the common market. [...]
[...] CJCE 1979, p pt 38). This definition, which has gone through all the stages of modernization of European competition law to this day, has thus enabled a uniform interpretation of the concept of dominant position, and in fact contributes to the respect of European competition law by national competition authorities. This judgment was therefore the starting point for a very extensive case law on the criteria defining the concept of dominant position. With this judgment, the CJEU consecrated the very existence of 'of very important parts» of the market that lead to a monopoly situation as proof of the existence of a dominant position(CJCE Feb aff. [...]
