Extract
[...] Dimensional institutional The responsibility of parliamentarians can also be presented in its institutional dimension. In addition to the rationalization of parliamentarism and the risk of a presidentialism ultra vires with deputies at the mercy of a President elected for seven, then five years, the consideration of the 'competition of the Constitutional Council, the progress of decentralization, the development of European norms have contributed to a real decline of the parliamentary institution9 ». The delicate balance that, since Montesquieu, has been established at the national level between the three branches of power (executive, legislative, and judicial) is struggling with the significant evolutions at the European level (both the European Parliament and the supranational jurisdictions that are the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union) and the predominance of the final decision of the supreme courts in France (Council of State, Court of Cassation, and Constitutional Council). [...]
[...] The Responsibility of Parliamentarians on Institutional Stability Introduction Institutional stability has, from the start, been a flagship issue of the Fifth Republic1. The 1958 Constitution embodies the will of General de Gaulle and Michel Debré to orient the French Republic towards a semi-presidential regime where the rationalization of Parliament was intended to improve relations between the executive and the legislative and give the former a greater hold over the latter in the perspective of the efficiency of public power2. In fact, as a consequence of the chronic instability of the Fourth Republic3, The Fifth Republic posits the idea of a stronger executive in service of political and institutional continuity. [...]
[...] In France, this is all the more true since the Fifth Republic is precisely the result of this split with the idea of an absolute predominance of Parliament over the executive; the 2008 constitutional revision advances the idea of a call to parliamentary action beyond the simple faculty, conferred by history on Parliament, of 'overturning the government'14 », within the furrow of parliamentary rationalization and modernization of 'the rule of law, offering citizens new access to their rights and freedoms'15 ». Finally, the progressive transfer of powers, traditionally devolved to national parliaments, to the European level and to the European Parliament via the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Maastricht, among others, collides with the legal construction of the institutional stability of parliamentarians16. Conclusion As such, the responsibility of parliamentarians on institutional stability is therefore at the crossroads of institutional, political, and legal responsibility. [...]
[...] This responsibility can be presented under a panel of three dimensions: a political, institutional, and legal dimension. Political Dimension The political dimension of the responsibility of parliamentarians is embodied mainly in the game of presidential and legislative elections. Within the framework of this telescoping of national elections, it is necessary for Parliament to show 'coherent and disciplined parliamentary majorities', which not only result from institutional mechanisms, but also from 'majoritarian voting mechanisms at two turns, restored for the election of deputies by General de Gaulle since his return to power'6 ». [...]
[...] This evolving responsibility of parliamentarians - a source, in part, of the mutation of the semi-presidential regime of the Fifth Republic - remains a major issue in understanding contemporary political and institutional phenomena. [...]
