European Arrest Warrant and Equal Treatment for Third-Country Nationals
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European Arrest Warrant, Italian Constitutional Court, third-country nationals, equal treatment, social security benefits, Directive 2011/98/UE, Article 34 European Charter, Article 3 Italian Constitution, Article 38 Italian Constitution, mutual trust, EU Member States, surrender procedures, Council Decision 2002/584/JAI, residence permit, long-term residence, social assistance, housing aid, dignified existence, fundamental rights, prejudicial question, CJEU, Court of Justice of the European Union, EU law, Italian law, Constitutional principles, European provisions, national provisions, cross-border jurisdiction, criminal offence, narcotic substance, INPS, Court of Cassation, Labour Section, constitutional legitimacy, EU directives, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, EU social policy
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Abstract
The Italian Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of a 2000 law regarding social benefits for third-country nationals and its relation to the European Arrest Warrant.
Extract
[...] According to the Court of Cassation, the 2000 law would be contrary to Article 38, paragraph 1 of the Constitution because there would be a 'close correlation' between this and Article 34 of the Charter, which, by recognizing the right to social assistance and housing aid, aims to ensure a dignified existence for all those who do not have sufficient resources. The Constitutional Court will consider that several constitutional principles are at stake, but also several European principles. This is the case, in particular, of the principle of equal treatment in social assistance (Directive 2011/98) applicable regardless of the reason or title of stay. [...]
[...] Despite this preliminary question, the Constitutional Court provides us with a set of elements of response that highlight the political and economic issues that arise from the question. This is particularly the case with regard to the issue of the tax contribution relating to social security for foreign nationals participating in the economic life of the State. Finally, according to the Italian Constitutional Court, the social rights of foreign nationals are closely linked to determined political wills And we find partially an answer to the preliminary question posed within the decision No. [...]
[...] Finally, the principle is that there is no refusal to surrender when a European arrest warrant is issued, but it must coexist with other fundamental rights of European law If exceptions to this principle have been recognized it must be done under certain conditions and this within the framework of the principle of mutual trust weighing on the Member States of the European Union I. The coexistence between the execution of a European arrest warrant and the fundamental rights of European law A. The European arrest warrant, a tool of European unity B. A precedence of fundamental rights over the execution of an arrest warrant II. [...]
[...] Firstly, it states that the only grounds that can be used to refuse are found in the framework decision 2002/584, and this according to its own interpretations. However, among the grounds, only situations of a 'temporary' nature are concerned. Secondly, even in this configuration, it must be ensured that the person's care can be of sufficient quality in the state where they are to be 'handed over'. In this case, it is up to the issuing judicial authority (here, Croatia) to ensure the absence of risk to the individual's health. [...]
[...] His pathology is chronic, while, on the other hand, the contested law only allows a European arrest warrant to be refused if it is a disease with a foreseeable duration. The President of the Council of Ministers as well as the Attorney General presented different objections, but the Court of Appeal still decided to suspend the case. She then poses a prejudicial question to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in November 2021. The question that was posed to her is no longer that of constitutionality for which she would not be competent. [...]
