Chronopost III: Limiting Liability Clauses in Express Transport Contracts

Extract

[...] The scope and extensions of the solution in contemporary positive law The study of the judgments of May does not stop at their immediate scope. Their influence far exceeds the contentiousness of express transport. It irrigates the entire law of contracts. It structures the subsequent case law. It prepares the 2016 reform. It contributes to the construction of contemporary positive law. It shows that the notion of essential obligation is not a simple punctual tool. It becomes a guiding principle. [...]

[...] The Court recalls that Chronopost, as an express transporter, undertakes to ensure a rapid delivery. It qualifies this obligation as an 'essential obligation'. It notes that the limiting clause provides for a very low compensation. It judges that this clause 'contradicts the scope of the essential obligation'. It deduces that it must be 'deemed not written'. The Court thus confirms the logic inaugurated in 1996. It reinforces the control exercised over limiting clauses. It protects the economy of the contract. [...]

[...] They show that the Court does not tolerate clauses that render the service illusory. They show that the Court controls the internal coherence of the contract. The doctrine has extensively commented on this neutralization. Some authors see it as a form of content control. They believe that the Court is conducting a proportionality check. They consider that the Court verifies the compatibility between the clause and the essential obligation. Others see it as an anticipation of Article 1170 of the Civil Code. They emphasize that the 2016 reform will enshrine this logic. [...]

[...] It is not limited to trivial damages. It applies as soon as the clause contradicts the essential obligation. It applies as soon as the clause makes the performance illusory. It applies as soon as the clause deprives the creditor of the expected compensation. It applies as soon as the clause destroys the purpose of the contract. This solution directly influences the subsequent jurisprudence. It prepares the ground for the judgment Faurecia I of 13 February 2007. In this judgment, the Court radicalizes the solution. [...]

[...] It applies the sanction already used in 1996. It neutralizes the clause. It does not pronounce the nullity of the contract. It preserves the general economy of the exchange. The Court implicitly mobilizes the notion of cause. It renews the logic of the old article 1131. It considers that the creditor would not have contracted if the essential obligation could be neutralized. It estimates that the clause suppresses the raison d'être of the contract. It judges that the clause destroys the contractual balance. [...]