Abstract
This paper aims at modelling an energy efficiency policy in order to evaluate its consequences on real estate and energy consumption. We use the closed general equilibrium model IMACLIM-S, that represents France's economy in 2004. After having introduce the households and firms maximization pro- gram, we define the rate of occupied buildings, that closes the supply and demand equilibrium. This rate is the key to understand the mechanism.
The money amount invested in energy efficiency is not allocated to construction and therefore the pressure on estate increases, as for the rate of occupied buildings. This higher rate is responsible for a higher rent, due to the de- crease of vacant buildings. There is no distinction between home-owners and renters in this model, only one aggregated household. This higher rent will be responsible for inflation.
We are in a perfect asymetric information situation, where households do not know they could extract a higher rent from the fact their building is green. They only know they will use less energy to have the same life stan- dard. It will be one of the several features that will be included within a next version of the paper. Here we observe the mechanism that says that "one euro invested in energy efficiency is one euro not invested in construction".
Nowadays the demand for green buildings, with high energy and environmental standards, is exploding. The anticipation for a strong increase of
energy prices is also responsible for a wilingness from both the governement and households to start renovation programs that aim at enhance buildings energy efficiency and consume less energy.
All these programs do have a cost, and the investment in this eld is not allocated to other sectors. We know that the whole households investment amount is devoted to construction. If this investment is reallocated to renovation, what will be the impact on buildings construction?
