Espionage and Ethics in Intelligence Activities

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[...] (2010). Intelligence between ethics and necessity. Security and Strategy, 3(HS1), 59-66. https://doi.org/10.3917/sestr.hs1.0059. Council of Europe, Venice Commission, Report on the Democratic Control of Security Services June 2007. Lafouasse, F. (2001). Espionage in International Law.French Yearbook of International Law, 47(1), 63-136. https://doi.org/10.3406/afdi.2001.3655 Law of 24 July 2015 on Intelligence. ( December). [...]

[...] This is why security services, by their nature, encroach on individual rights. It is therefore imperative to set limits both internally and externally to their activities Security services must be 'controllable'. This means they must be accountable for their actions and, if necessary, face the consequences, take responsibility and put things right if it appears that errors have been made2. Furthermore, these techniques can only be implemented for strictly defined purposes by law: protection of national security, defense of France's essential interests (political, economic or scientific), respect of its international commitments, prevention of terrorism, crime and organized delinquency, fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as prevention of collective violence that could seriously threaten public peace3. [...]

[...] It must therefore continue to inscribe itself in its finality aiming at national security, but with a framework for these activities. II. A specific ethical framework for the regulation of espionage activities To date, legal texts have framed the activity. In France, it is the law of July on intelligence, which specifies the implementation of intelligence techniques to an authorization from the Prime Minister, after advice from an independent administrative authority. In other words, these techniques must be evaluated and validated by one of the highest authorities of the State before being implemented. [...]

[...] But this tension does not imply the impossibility of an ethical reflection applied to intelligence. In reality, this specific activity aimed at maintaining a country's national security can involve political costs to anticipate and show, according to Walzer, that it can be difficult to carry out such activities without entering into a logic of "dirty hands," that is, activities that will always be morally reprehensible. However, Claire Fabre attempts to provide a minimal framework for evaluating the moral justice of an action in an intelligence activity such as espionage. [...]

[...] In the case of the assassination of Ben Laden, this could be justified only if he could continue to influence terrorist activities. If we apply this reasoning to the question of espionage, the wiretapping of an individual can only be justified if open-source means have already been tested and do not allow the desired goal to be achieved. The second criterion is that of proportionality. The principle of proportionality requires that the action undertaken by the intelligence services be proportionate to the expected benefits. [...]