Abstract
During the Cold War, deterrence was at the core of international foreign policy having a bilateral symmetry. With the end of the Cold War the realm of nuclear issues has undergone a substantial change and with emerging security challenges and an asymmetry of international actors. Even if underlying, the topic of deterrence resurfaces on the European stage, due to EU integration and also in regards to the hypothesis of development of a common deterrent for the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty that came into force in December 2009 envisions an even closer interconnection of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union needs to reflect upon the future of a common defense and the subject of a common European deterrent. Due to the fact that two of the EU member states, France and Great Britain have nuclear weapons the question of whether these should be incorporated into the new defense arrangements may arise.
Some people may argue that as for the possible implementation of a common EU deterrence, a legal status for a common European deterrence to some extent might be tangible under certain conditions. Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states that "each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
